CVE-2009-1123
Microsoft Windows Improper Input Validation Vulnerability
Microsoft Windows
The kernel in Microsoft Windows 2000 SP4, XP SP2 and SP3, Server 2003 SP2, Vista Gold, SP1, and SP2, and Server 2008 SP2 does not properly validate changes to unspecified kernel objects, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka "Windows Kernel Desktop Vulnerability."
Exploitation status
CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities
Listed by CISA on 3 March 2022. US federal agencies were required to remediate it by 24 March 2022.
EPSS — exploitation probability
FIRST puts the probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days at 4.9%, which is higher than 91.9% of all scored vulnerabilities. EPSS is a forecast of activity, not a measure of severity, and it is rescored daily.
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Frequently asked questions
Is CVE-2009-1123 being exploited by ransomware groups?
No ransomware group in this database is currently recorded as exploiting CVE-2009-1123.
What does CVE-2009-1123 affect?
CVE-2009-1123 affects Microsoft Windows. The kernel in Microsoft Windows 2000 SP4, XP SP2 and SP3, Server 2003 SP2, Vista Gold, SP1, and SP2, and Server 2008 SP2 does not properly validate changes to unspecified kernel objects, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka "Windows Kernel Desktop Vulnerability."
How severe is CVE-2009-1123?
CVE-2009-1123 is rated HIGH with a CVSS base score of 7.8. EPSS puts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days at 4.9%, higher than 91.9% of all scored vulnerabilities. It is listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, with a federal remediation deadline of 24 March 2022.
How should organisations respond to CVE-2009-1123?
Apply the vendor patch for Microsoft Windows as the first priority, and treat any internet-facing instance as the most urgent. Because this vulnerability is associated with ransomware activity, also review whether the affected systems were reachable before patching, rather than assuming that patching alone closes the incident.