CVE-2017-0210
Microsoft Internet Explorer Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
Microsoft Internet Explorer
An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists when Internet Explorer does not properly enforce cross-domain policies, which could allow an attacker to access information from one domain and inject it into another domain, aka "Internet Explorer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."
Exploitation status
CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities
Listed by CISA on 24 May 2022. US federal agencies were required to remediate it by 14 June 2022.
EPSS — exploitation probability
FIRST puts the probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days at 22.3%, which is higher than 97.7% of all scored vulnerabilities. EPSS is a forecast of activity, not a measure of severity, and it is rescored daily.
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Frequently asked questions
Is CVE-2017-0210 being exploited by ransomware groups?
No ransomware group in this database is currently recorded as exploiting CVE-2017-0210.
What does CVE-2017-0210 affect?
CVE-2017-0210 affects Microsoft Internet Explorer. An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists when Internet Explorer does not properly enforce cross-domain policies, which could allow an attacker to access information from one domain and inject it into another domain, aka "Internet Explorer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."
How severe is CVE-2017-0210?
CVE-2017-0210 is rated HIGH with a CVSS base score of 8.8. EPSS puts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days at 22.3%, higher than 97.7% of all scored vulnerabilities. It is listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, with a federal remediation deadline of 14 June 2022.
How should organisations respond to CVE-2017-0210?
Apply the vendor patch for Microsoft Internet Explorer as the first priority, and treat any internet-facing instance as the most urgent. Because this vulnerability is associated with ransomware activity, also review whether the affected systems were reachable before patching, rather than assuming that patching alone closes the incident.