CVE-2020-5722
Grandstream Networks UCM6200 Series SQL Injection Vulnerability
Grandstream UCM6200
The HTTP interface of the Grandstream UCM6200 series is vulnerable to an unauthenticated remote SQL injection via crafted HTTP request. An attacker can use this vulnerability to execute shell commands as root on versions before 1.0.19.20 or inject HTML in password recovery emails in versions before 1.0.20.17.
Exploitation status
CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities
Listed by CISA on 28 January 2022. US federal agencies were required to remediate it by 28 July 2022.
EPSS — exploitation probability
FIRST puts the probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days at 84.3%, which is higher than 99.7% of all scored vulnerabilities. EPSS is a forecast of activity, not a measure of severity, and it is rescored daily.
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Frequently asked questions
Is CVE-2020-5722 being exploited by ransomware groups?
No ransomware group in this database is currently recorded as exploiting CVE-2020-5722.
What does CVE-2020-5722 affect?
CVE-2020-5722 affects Grandstream UCM6200. The HTTP interface of the Grandstream UCM6200 series is vulnerable to an unauthenticated remote SQL injection via crafted HTTP request. An attacker can use this vulnerability to execute shell commands as root on versions before 1.0.19.20 or inject HTML in password recovery emails in versions before 1.0.20.17.
How severe is CVE-2020-5722?
CVE-2020-5722 is rated CRITICAL with a CVSS base score of 9.8. EPSS puts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days at 84.3%, higher than 99.7% of all scored vulnerabilities. It is listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, with a federal remediation deadline of 28 July 2022.
How should organisations respond to CVE-2020-5722?
Apply the vendor patch for Grandstream UCM6200 as the first priority, and treat any internet-facing instance as the most urgent. Because this vulnerability is associated with ransomware activity, also review whether the affected systems were reachable before patching, rather than assuming that patching alone closes the incident.