CVE-2023-29552
Service Location Protocol (SLP) Denial-of-Service Vulnerability
IETF Service Location Protocol (SLP)
The Service Location Protocol (SLP, RFC 2608) allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to register arbitrary services. This could allow the attacker to use spoofed UDP traffic to conduct a denial-of-service attack with a significant amplification factor.
Exploitation status
CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities
Listed by CISA on 8 November 2023. US federal agencies were required to remediate it by 29 November 2023.
EPSS — exploitation probability
FIRST puts the probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days at 64%, which is higher than 99.2% of all scored vulnerabilities. EPSS is a forecast of activity, not a measure of severity, and it is rescored daily.
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Frequently asked questions
Is CVE-2023-29552 being exploited by ransomware groups?
No ransomware group in this database is currently recorded as exploiting CVE-2023-29552.
What does CVE-2023-29552 affect?
CVE-2023-29552 affects IETF Service Location Protocol (SLP). The Service Location Protocol (SLP, RFC 2608) allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to register arbitrary services. This could allow the attacker to use spoofed UDP traffic to conduct a denial-of-service attack with a significant amplification factor.
How severe is CVE-2023-29552?
CVE-2023-29552 is rated HIGH with a CVSS base score of 7.5. EPSS puts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days at 64%, higher than 99.2% of all scored vulnerabilities. It is listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, with a federal remediation deadline of 29 November 2023.
How should organisations respond to CVE-2023-29552?
Apply the vendor patch for IETF Service Location Protocol (SLP) as the first priority, and treat any internet-facing instance as the most urgent. Because this vulnerability is associated with ransomware activity, also review whether the affected systems were reachable before patching, rather than assuming that patching alone closes the incident.