CVE-2024-9463
Palo Alto Networks Expedition OS Command Injection Vulnerability
Palo Alto Networks Expedition
An OS command injection vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks Expedition allows an unauthenticated attacker to run arbitrary OS commands as root in Expedition, resulting in disclosure of usernames, cleartext passwords, device configurations, and device API keys of PAN-OS firewalls.
Exploitation status
CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities
Listed by CISA on 14 November 2024. US federal agencies were required to remediate it by 5 December 2024.
EPSS — exploitation probability
FIRST puts the probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days at 98.5%, which is higher than 99.9% of all scored vulnerabilities. EPSS is a forecast of activity, not a measure of severity, and it is rescored daily.
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Frequently asked questions
Is CVE-2024-9463 being exploited by ransomware groups?
No ransomware group in this database is currently recorded as exploiting CVE-2024-9463.
What does CVE-2024-9463 affect?
CVE-2024-9463 affects Palo Alto Networks Expedition. An OS command injection vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks Expedition allows an unauthenticated attacker to run arbitrary OS commands as root in Expedition, resulting in disclosure of usernames, cleartext passwords, device configurations, and device API keys of PAN-OS firewalls.
How severe is CVE-2024-9463?
CVE-2024-9463 is rated HIGH with a CVSS base score of 7.5. EPSS puts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days at 98.5%, higher than 99.9% of all scored vulnerabilities. It is listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, with a federal remediation deadline of 5 December 2024.
How should organisations respond to CVE-2024-9463?
Apply the vendor patch for Palo Alto Networks Expedition as the first priority, and treat any internet-facing instance as the most urgent. Because this vulnerability is associated with ransomware activity, also review whether the affected systems were reachable before patching, rather than assuming that patching alone closes the incident.