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Cyber Threat
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Ransomware victim Other

Apollo Office System

Listed by Orova on · organisation based in Japan

www.apollo-net.com

Disclosed
Aug 4, 2026
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Orova
66 victims listed
Country
Japan
#12 most targeted
Sector
Other

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Orova. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About the Orova group

First seen 2026-07-07 Orova has listed 63 victims since May 2026.

How Orova is documented to operate

Valid Accounts T1078 Stealth Persistence

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network.

Mitigations: Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, Multi-factor Authentication, Application Developer Guidance, User Training

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution T1547 Persistence Privilege Escalation

Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon. These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Network Sniffing T1040 Credential Access Discovery

Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.

Mitigations: User Account Management, Multi-factor Authentication, Encrypt Sensitive Information, Network Segmentation

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Remote Services T1021 Lateral Movement

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a service that accepts remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. In an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to log in using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could log in to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).

Mitigations: Limit Access to Resource Over Network, Audit, User Account Management, Disable or Remove Feature or Program, Multi-factor Authentication, Password Policies

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Use Alternate Authentication Material T1550 Lateral Movement

Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls. Authentication processes generally require a valid identity (e.g., username) along with one or more authentication factors (e.g., password, pin, physical smart card, token generator, etc.). Alternate authentication material is legitimately generated by systems after a user or application successfully authenticates by providing a valid identity and the required authentication factor(s).

Mitigations: Audit, Password Policies, Account Use Policies, Privileged Account Management, Active Directory Configuration, Application Developer Guidance

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Web Protocols T1071.001 Command And Control

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. Protocols such as HTTP/S and WebSocket that carry web traffic may be very common in environments. HTTP/S packets have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.

Mitigations: Network Intrusion Prevention, Filter Network Traffic

MITRE ATT&CK reference

MITRE ATT&CK techniques attributed to Orova across its recorded activity, not a finding about how Apollo Office System was reached.

Incident analysis

Apollo Office System was listed by Orova ransomware, a group with 66 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on August 4, 2026.

Apollo Office System is based in Japan and operates in the Other sector. Japan ranks #12 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 310 victims in this database.

Sector context. Organisations in this sector hold valuable data and operational systems that ransomware groups seek to exploit for financial gain through encryption and data exfiltration.

Orova typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was Apollo Office System attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Apollo Office System was listed as a victim of the Orova ransomware group on August 4, 2026. The organisation is based in Japan and operates in the Other sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Apollo Office System?

Apollo Office System was attacked by Orova ransomware. Orova is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 66 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Apollo Office System ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Apollo Office System was disclosed on August 4, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Apollo Office System ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Apollo Office System has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Other organisation, Apollo Office System likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Orova attacks?

To defend against Orova and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.