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Cyber Threat
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Ransomware victim Manufacturing

Cerámicas Kantu

Listed by Panzer on

Disclosed
Sep 13, 2026
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Panzer
58 victims listed
Country
Unknown
Sector
Manufacturing

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Panzer. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

Panzer listed Cerámicas Kantu on its dark web leak site on 13 September 2026. The Peruvian company specializes in manufacturing decorative tiles and accessories made from ceramic, porcelain and glass.

About Cerámicas Kantu

Cerámicas Kantu S.A.C. is a Peruvian company specializing in the manufacturing of decorative tiles and accessories made from ceramic, porcelain, and glass. With over 40 years of experience in the ceramic industry and more than 15 years in producing construction finishes, they offer high-quality products with innovative designs. Their intended clients include distributors and individuals looking to enhance their spaces with unique decorative elements. The company emphasizes customer service and provides assistance through their sales advisors.

Source record: ransomware.live

About the Panzer group

Panzer has listed 39 victims since August 2026.

Vulnerabilities Panzer is recorded exploiting

4 of these 4 are in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, 4 of them recorded by CISA as used in ransomware campaigns. CVEs attributed to Panzer across its reported activity. There is no indication that any of these was involved in the Cerámicas Kantu incident — the source data does not record an entry point.

Incident analysis

Cerámicas Kantu was listed by Panzer ransomware, a group with 58 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on September 13, 2026.

Sector context. Manufacturing companies are frequently targeted because production downtime directly translates to financial loss. Ransomware operators exploit this time-sensitivity to demand higher ransoms and faster payment.

Panzer typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was Cerámicas Kantu attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Cerámicas Kantu was listed as a victim of the Panzer ransomware group on September 13, 2026 and operates in the Manufacturing sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Cerámicas Kantu?

Cerámicas Kantu was attacked by Panzer ransomware. Panzer is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 58 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Cerámicas Kantu ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Cerámicas Kantu was disclosed on September 13, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Cerámicas Kantu ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Cerámicas Kantu has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Manufacturing organisation, Cerámicas Kantu likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Panzer attacks?

To defend against Panzer and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.