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Ransomware victim Retail & E-Commerce

Culinary Specialties

Listed by Aoqin on · organisation based in United States

Disclosed
Nov 16, 2026
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Aoqin
11 victims listed
Country
United States
#1 most targeted
Sector
Retail & E-Commerce

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Aoqin. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About Culinary Specialties

CULINARY SPECIALTIES was started in April of 1996 by Chris Schragner working with non perishable food items out of his guest room. Due to increasing demand of the products, the business was moved into a warehouse where a few months later Patrick O'Farrell joined the operation. Still relying on outsourcing all products, and because of numerous inquiries by local chefs for customized appetizers, the company moved again into a USDA approved facility north of San Diego. Initially, the company only served the San Diego market, but word spread about the company's quality and the willingness to work directly with the chefs to produce specialty gourmet items to their specifications. After only a one year period, the company again had to move due to the rapid increase of business with the company's customers. The company's new production facility is now located in San Marcos centrally located between San Diego, Los Angeles and Palm Springs. Status: Not paid. Data publication: 2026-11-20 14:16 UTC. Revenue: $11.5M. Employees: 1. Data type: clientsData, personal, accounting.

Source record: ransomware.live

About the Aoqin group

Aoqin has listed 4 victims since November 2026.

Incident analysis

Culinary Specialties was listed by Aoqin ransomware, a group with 11 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on November 16, 2026.

Culinary Specialties is based in United States and operates in the Retail & E-Commerce sector. United States ranks #1 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 10,595 victims in this database.

Sector context. Organisations in this sector hold valuable data and operational systems that ransomware groups seek to exploit for financial gain through encryption and data exfiltration.

Aoqin typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Frequently asked questions

Was Culinary Specialties attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Culinary Specialties was listed as a victim of the Aoqin ransomware group on November 16, 2026. The organisation is based in United States and operates in the Retail & E-Commerce sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Culinary Specialties?

Culinary Specialties was attacked by Aoqin ransomware. Aoqin is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 11 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Culinary Specialties ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Culinary Specialties was disclosed on November 16, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Culinary Specialties ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Culinary Specialties has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Retail & E-Commerce organisation, Culinary Specialties likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Aoqin attacks?

To defend against Aoqin and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.