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Cyber Threat
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Ransomware victim Energy

energogroup.net

Listed by Warlock on · organisation based in Russia

energogroup.net

Disclosed
Nov 6, 2025
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Warlock
78 victims listed
Country
Russia
#44 most targeted
Sector
Energy

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Warlock. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About the Warlock group

The Warlock ransomware and operator(s) are believed to be attributed to Storm-2603, a China-based threat actor who is also known to have deployed LockBit ransomware. There's also a crossover between victims with Black Basta. Both are RaaS and have a long list of known and unknown affiliates. Having said that, this is possibly an affiliate (likely a cybergroup) of both of those groups. The Alliance & Association would technically be Encryptor Sharing, but this is realistically more of an "Old Affiliate" that created their own ransomware encryptor and operation. Warlock has listed 78 victims since April 2025.

Vulnerabilities Warlock is recorded exploiting

6 of these 6 are in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, 4 of them recorded by CISA as used in ransomware campaigns. CVEs attributed to Warlock across its reported activity. There is no indication that any of these was involved in the energogroup.net incident — the source data does not record an entry point.

Incident analysis

energogroup.net was listed by Warlock ransomware, a group with 78 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on November 6, 2025.

energogroup.net is based in Russia and operates in the Energy sector. Russia ranks #44 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 62 victims in this database.

Sector context. Energy sector attacks can have critical infrastructure implications. Ransomware on operational technology (OT) networks can disrupt power generation and distribution, elevating the urgency of recovery.

Warlock typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was energogroup.net attacked by ransomware?

Yes. energogroup.net was listed as a victim of the Warlock ransomware group on November 6, 2025. The organisation is based in Russia and operates in the Energy sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked energogroup.net?

energogroup.net was attacked by Warlock ransomware. Warlock is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 78 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the energogroup.net ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on energogroup.net was disclosed on November 6, 2025. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the energogroup.net ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from energogroup.net has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Energy organisation, energogroup.net likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Warlock attacks?

To defend against Warlock and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.