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Cyber Threat
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Ransomware victim Healthcare

Intermed Hospital Mongolia

Listed by Spacebears on · organisation based in Mongolia

intermed.mn

Disclosed
Nov 8, 2024
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Spacebears
166 victims listed
Country
Mongolia
#87 most targeted
Sector
Healthcare

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Spacebears. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About the Spacebears group

Space Bears is a double-extortion ransomware group that emerged in April 2024, distinguished by a professional "corporate" aesthetic on its leak site, leveraging Phobos RaaS infrastructure and targeting small-to-medium organizations in manufacturing, technology, and healthcare across the US and Europe. Spacebears has listed 157 victims since April 2024.

Vulnerabilities Spacebears is recorded exploiting

5 of these 5 are in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, 5 of them recorded by CISA as used in ransomware campaigns. CVEs attributed to Spacebears across its reported activity. There is no indication that any of these was involved in the Intermed Hospital Mongolia incident — the source data does not record an entry point.

Incident analysis

Intermed Hospital Mongolia was listed by Spacebears ransomware, a group with 166 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on November 8, 2024.

Intermed Hospital Mongolia is based in Mongolia and operates in the Healthcare sector. Mongolia ranks #87 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 9 victims in this database.

Sector context. Healthcare organisations are high-value ransomware targets because patient data is extremely sensitive, regulatory penalties for breaches are severe, and operational downtime can threaten patient safety — all factors that increase ransom payment pressure.

Spacebears typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was Intermed Hospital Mongolia attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Intermed Hospital Mongolia was listed as a victim of the Spacebears ransomware group on November 8, 2024. The organisation is based in Mongolia and operates in the Healthcare sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Intermed Hospital Mongolia?

Intermed Hospital Mongolia was attacked by Spacebears ransomware. Spacebears is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 166 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Intermed Hospital Mongolia ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Intermed Hospital Mongolia was disclosed on November 8, 2024. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Intermed Hospital Mongolia ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Intermed Hospital Mongolia has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Healthcare organisation, Intermed Hospital Mongolia likely held patient records, medical data, and personally identifiable information (PII).

How can organisations protect against Spacebears attacks?

To defend against Spacebears and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.