Skip to content
Cyber Threat
CTI Academy Sponsor CTI Academy
Ransomware victim Energy & Utilities

Petroshahd(Enap Sipetrol International - Egypt Branch)

Listed by Aoqin on · organisation based in Chile

Disclosed
Nov 4, 2026
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Aoqin
4 victims listed
Country
Chile
#36 most targeted
Sector
Energy & Utilities

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Aoqin. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About Petroshahd(Enap Sipetrol International - Egypt Branch)

Established in 1950 and headquartered in Las Condes, Chile, ENAP is engaged in the exploration, production, and refining of hydrocarbons and their derivatives. ENAP performs logistical and site maintenance to operational sites. Status: Not paid. Data publication: 2026-11-11 11:00 UTC. Revenue: $504.9M. Employees: 5000. Data type: confidential, clientsData, banking.

Source record: ransomware.live

About the Aoqin group

Aoqin has listed 4 victims since November 2026.

Incident analysis

Petroshahd(Enap Sipetrol International - Egypt Branch) was listed by Aoqin ransomware, a group with 4 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on November 4, 2026.

Petroshahd(Enap Sipetrol International - Egypt Branch) is based in Chile and operates in the Energy & Utilities sector. Chile ranks #36 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 82 victims in this database.

Sector context. Organisations in this sector hold valuable data and operational systems that ransomware groups seek to exploit for financial gain through encryption and data exfiltration.

Aoqin typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was Petroshahd(Enap Sipetrol International - Egypt Branch) attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Petroshahd(Enap Sipetrol International - Egypt Branch) was listed as a victim of the Aoqin ransomware group on November 4, 2026. The organisation is based in Chile and operates in the Energy & Utilities sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Petroshahd(Enap Sipetrol International - Egypt Branch)?

Petroshahd(Enap Sipetrol International - Egypt Branch) was attacked by Aoqin ransomware. Aoqin is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 4 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Petroshahd(Enap Sipetrol International - Egypt Branch) ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Petroshahd(Enap Sipetrol International - Egypt Branch) was disclosed on November 4, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Petroshahd(Enap Sipetrol International - Egypt Branch) ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Petroshahd(Enap Sipetrol International - Egypt Branch) has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Energy & Utilities organisation, Petroshahd(Enap Sipetrol International - Egypt Branch) likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Aoqin attacks?

To defend against Aoqin and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.