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Ransomware victim Transportation

TRANSPORTES JIMENEZ and REYES JIM REY S.A.

Listed by Emperador on · organisation based in Mexico

Disclosed
Oct 26, 2026
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Emperador
74 victims listed
Country
Mexico
#12 most targeted
Sector
Transportation

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Emperador. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About TRANSPORTES JIMENEZ and REYES JIM REY S.A.

Transport company from Ecuador engaged in road freight transport. Including the transportation of heavy and bulk cargo, cars, animals and cargo in tanks. Year Founded: 2020 There are many customer documents and employee data. Financial documents, accounting and banking data. [Sector: Transportation]

Source record: ransomware.live

About the Emperador group

Emperador has listed 38 victims since August 2026.

Vulnerabilities Emperador is recorded exploiting

5 of these 5 are in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, 5 of them recorded by CISA as used in ransomware campaigns. CVEs attributed to Emperador across its reported activity. There is no indication that any of these was involved in the TRANSPORTES JIMENEZ and REYES JIM REY S.A. incident — the source data does not record an entry point.

Incident analysis

TRANSPORTES JIMENEZ and REYES JIM REY S.A. was listed by Emperador ransomware, a group with 74 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on October 26, 2026.

TRANSPORTES JIMENEZ and REYES JIM REY S.A. is based in Mexico and operates in the Transportation sector. Mexico ranks #12 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 295 victims in this database.

Sector context. Organisations in this sector hold valuable data and operational systems that ransomware groups seek to exploit for financial gain through encryption and data exfiltration.

Emperador typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Frequently asked questions

Was TRANSPORTES JIMENEZ and REYES JIM REY S.A. attacked by ransomware?

Yes. TRANSPORTES JIMENEZ and REYES JIM REY S.A. was listed as a victim of the Emperador ransomware group on October 26, 2026. The organisation is based in Mexico and operates in the Transportation sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked TRANSPORTES JIMENEZ and REYES JIM REY S.A.?

TRANSPORTES JIMENEZ and REYES JIM REY S.A. was attacked by Emperador ransomware. Emperador is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 74 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the TRANSPORTES JIMENEZ and REYES JIM REY S.A. ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on TRANSPORTES JIMENEZ and REYES JIM REY S.A. was disclosed on October 26, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the TRANSPORTES JIMENEZ and REYES JIM REY S.A. ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from TRANSPORTES JIMENEZ and REYES JIM REY S.A. has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Transportation organisation, TRANSPORTES JIMENEZ and REYES JIM REY S.A. likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Emperador attacks?

To defend against Emperador and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.