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Ransomware Victim Healthcare

University Diagnostic Medical Imaging, PC (udmi.net)

Ransomware attack by Fog · Disclosed March 13, 2025 · 🇺🇸 United States

udmi.net

Date Disclosed
Mar 13, 2025
2025
Threat Group
Fog
189 total victims
Country
🇺🇸 United States
Industry
Healthcare

ThreatAI Analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Fog. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About the Fog group

Fog, which uses the .flocked extension for encrypted files, was first observed in May in campaigns by Storm-0844, a threat actor known for distributing Akira. By June, Storm-0844 was deploying Fog more than Akira. Fog has listed 189 victims since December 2021.

Incident Analysis

University Diagnostic Medical Imaging, PC (udmi.net) was targeted by Fog ransomware, one of the most active ransomware groups in our database with 189 confirmed victims globally. The attack was disclosed on March 13, 2025, when University Diagnostic Medical Imaging, PC (udmi.net) appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

University Diagnostic Medical Imaging, PC (udmi.net) is based in United States , operating in the Healthcare sector. United States ranks #1 globally for ransomware attacks, with 9,542 victims in our database.

Sector context: Healthcare organisations are high-value ransomware targets because patient data is extremely sensitive, regulatory penalties for breaches are severe, and operational downtime can threaten patient safety — all factors that increase ransom payment pressure.

Fog typically employs a double extortion model: first exfiltrating sensitive data from the victim's systems, then deploying ransomware to encrypt files. Victims face two simultaneous threats — paying to restore access and paying to prevent publication of stolen data. The group's leak site publishes victim names and exfiltrated data as leverage.

Data source: This incident record is sourced from public ransomware group leak site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. Disclosure date reflects when the victim was published on the leak site, which may differ from the initial date of compromise. This platform does not publish or link to stolen data. Last data update: Sep 21, 2026 10:00 UTC.

Frequently Asked Questions

Was University Diagnostic Medical Imaging, PC (udmi.net) attacked by ransomware?

Yes. University Diagnostic Medical Imaging, PC (udmi.net) was listed as a victim of the Fog ransomware group on March 13, 2025. The organisation is based in United States and operates in the Healthcare sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked University Diagnostic Medical Imaging, PC (udmi.net)?

University Diagnostic Medical Imaging, PC (udmi.net) was attacked by Fog ransomware. Fog is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 189 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the University Diagnostic Medical Imaging, PC (udmi.net) ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on University Diagnostic Medical Imaging, PC (udmi.net) was disclosed on March 13, 2025. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the University Diagnostic Medical Imaging, PC (udmi.net) ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from University Diagnostic Medical Imaging, PC (udmi.net) has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Healthcare organisation, University Diagnostic Medical Imaging, PC (udmi.net) likely held patient records, medical data, and personally identifiable information (PII).

How can organisations protect against Fog attacks?

To defend against Fog and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.