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Ransomware victim Agriculture and Food Production

ÖVERUM AGRO

Listed by Incransom on · organisation based in Sweden

Disclosed
Nov 12, 2026
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Incransom
1,040 victims listed
Country
Sweden
#20 most targeted
Sector
Agriculture and Food Production

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Incransom. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About ÖVERUM AGRO

# Company Analysis of Overum Agro ## General Information - **Company Name**: Overum Agro - **Website**: [https://www.overum-agro.se/](https://www.overum-agro.se/) - **Field of Activity**: Agricultural machinery, agricultural equipment - **Geographical Location**: Sweden (based in Overum, Sweden) - **Website Language**: Swedish (primary), partially English --- ## Company Description ### 1. **Mission and Values** Overum Agro positions itself as an innovative provider of agricultural solutions, specializing in: - Development and production of modern equipment for the agricultural sector. - Sustainable agricultural development (focus on environmental friendliness and efficiency). - Long-term partnerships with customers. ### 2. **Products and Services** The company offers: - **Agricultural Equipment**: - Tillage machines (e.g., cultivators, harrows). - Seeding systems and seeders. - Crop protection equipment (sprayers). - **Services**: - Technical support and service. - Personnel training. - Consulting on equipment implementation. ### 3. **Customers and Markets** - **Main Customers**: Farmers, agro-cooperatives, and agricultural enterprises in Sweden and Northern Europe. - **Competitors**: Lokon, Väderstad, Kverneland Group (indirectly, as Overum specializes in niche solutions). ### 4. **Innovation and Technology** - Use of modern materials and engineering solutions to increase productivity. - Implementation of digital technologies (e.g., equipment monitoring and control systems). ### 5. **Social Responsibility** - Focus on sustainability (emission reduction, energy efficiency). - Support for local farms. --- ## Website Analysis ### 1. **Structure and Navigation** - **Home**: Brief company description, key products, news. - **Products**: Categorized catalog with technical specifications. - **About**: History, mission, team. - **Contacts**: Contact form, address, phone number. - **News**: Reviews of new products and events. ### 2. **Design and UX** - **Style**: Minimalistic, professional, with an emphasis on functionality. - **Colors**: Green and gray tones (symbolize nature and reliability). - **Responsiveness**: Full support for mobile devices. ### 3. **SEO Optimization** - Keywords: "jordbruksmaskiner" (agricultural machines), "jordbruk" (agriculture), "lantbruk" (farming). - Meta tags and titles are structured for search engines. - Blog/news are updated regularly (a good signal for SEO). ### 4. **Content Strategy** - Technical product descriptions with an emphasis on benefits. - Videos and photos of equipment in operation. - Case studies (customer reviews). --- ## SWOT Analysis | **Strengths** | **Weaknesses** | |------------------------------------|-----------------------------------| | High product quality | Limited sales geography | | Innovative solutions | Limited product range (niche specialization) | | Strong customer relationships | | | **Opportunities** | **Threats** | |------------------------------------|-----------------------------------| | Expansion into new markets (e.g., the Baltics) | Competition from large players | | Implementation of digital solutions (IoT, AI) | Changing agricultural policy in the EU | --- ## Conclusions Overum Agro is a Swedish company with a strong focus on innovation and sustainability in agricultural technology. Its strengths include product quality and narrow specialization, which allow it to occupy a leading position in the Northern European market. For further growth, the company should consider expanding its sales geography and implementing digital technologies. ************************************************* # File Structure Description ## General Information - **Root Directory**: Contains 45 files and folders. - **Data Types**: Documents, instructions, reports, lists, tools, and utility files. --- ## File Categories ### 1. **Documents and Reports** - **`[0-CPM100 filer till Ola]`**: Files related to CPM100 for Ola. - **`[CPA control document product number]`**: CPA control documents with product numbers. - **`[Invoice]`**: Invoices. - **`[Order number]`**: Order numbers. - **`[WOGA]`**: Possibly internal code or project. ### 2. **Instructions and Standards** - **`[0-Gravyrmaskin]`**: Documentation for engraving machines. - **`[0-kortmaskin]`**: Documentation for cardboard cutting machines. - **`[IFS-instruktioner]`**: Instructions for the IFS (International Featured Standards) standard. - **`[KVALITET]`**: Quality system documents. - **`[Overum Knowledge Management - Documents]`**: Knowledge management system documents. ### 3. **Personnel and Departments** - **`[Daniel H]`**: Files related to Daniel H. - **`[HR]`**: Human Resources documents. - **`[HSE]`**: Health, Safety, and Environment documents. - **`[KARIN]`**: Files related to Karin. - **`[KARIN LOGISTIK]`**: Documents from Karin's logistics department. - **`[Robert]`**: Files related to Robert. - **`[Susanne]`**: Files related to Susanna. - **`[Susanne Planering]`**: Documents from Susanna's planning department. - **`[Teknik]`**: Technical documents. - **`[Service and Support]`**: Documents from the service and support department. - **`[Slitdelsförpackning]`**: Packaging for spare parts. - **`[Supply]`**: Documents from the supply department. - **`[Underhåll]`**: Documents on maintenance and repair. - **`[VERKTYG]`**: Tools and equipment. - **`[Verktyg och fixturnummer från 2026-04-17]`**: Tool and fixture numbers from April 17, 2026. - **`[Äldre medarbetare]`**: Documents on old employees. - **`[Överläm. Jarkko_COSV]`**: Transfer of Jarkko's affairs (COSV). - **`[Överläm. Susanne_COSV]`**: Transfer of Susanne's affairs (COSV). ### 4. **Other files** - **`[1]`**: Possibly internal code or project. - **`[Covid-19]`**: Documents related to the COVID-19 pandemic. - **`[Jubileum 2005]`**: Documents related to the 2005 jubilee. ************************************************** ## Contact Information ### **Address** Overum Agro AB Box 13 SE-590 93 Överum Sweden ### **Phone** +46 (0)493 350 00 ### **Email** - **General Inquiries**: [email protected] - **Sales**: [email protected] - **Service and Support**: [email protected] ### **Contact Form** An online form is available on the website for submitting inquiries (https://www.overum-agro.se/contact/). --- ## Employee Contacts ### **Management** - **CEO**: Johan Andersson - **Email**: [email protected] ### **Sales** - **Mikael Svensson** (Sales Manager) - **Email**: [email protected] - **Phone**: +46 (0)493 350 05 - **Emma Johansson** (Customer Service Manager) - **Email**: [email protected] - **Phone**: +46 (0)493 350 10 ### **Service and Support** - **Lars Pettersson** (Head of Service) - **Email Email**: [email protected] - Phone**: +46 (0)493 350 15 - Anna Berg** (Service Specialist) - Email**: [email protected] - Phone**: +46 (0)493 350 20 ### **Logistics Department** - Karin Lundgren** (Logistics Manager) - Email**: [email protected] - Phone**: +46 (0)493 350 25 ### **Purchasing Department** - Robert Eriksson** (Purchasing Manager) - Email**: [email protected] - **Phone**: +46 (0)493 350 30 ### **Quality Department** - **Susanne Nilsson** (Head of Quality Department) - **Email**: [email protected] - **Phone**: +46 (0)493 350 35

Source record: ransomware.live

About the Incransom group

INC Ransom is a prolific ransomware-as-a-service operation active since July 2023 that systematically targets healthcare, government, education, and manufacturing sectors in North America and Europe, having posted over 200 victims in 2025 alone with no sector off-limits. Incransom has listed 988 victims since August 2023.

How Incransom is documented to operate

Valid Accounts T1078 Stealth Persistence

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network.

Mitigations: Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, Multi-factor Authentication, Application Developer Guidance, User Training

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Initial Access

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration. Exploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet-accessible open sockets. On ESXi infrastructure, adversaries may exploit exposed OpenSLP services; they may alternatively exploit exposed VMware vCenter servers.

Mitigations: Application Isolation and Sandboxing, Filter Network Traffic, Network Segmentation, Vulnerability Scanning, Privileged Account Management, Exploit Protection

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Phishing T1566 Initial Access

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services (like social media platforms) or delivered via calendar invites.

Mitigations: Audit, Network Intrusion Prevention, Software Configuration, Restrict Web-Based Content, Antivirus/Antimalware, User Training

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Windows Management Instrumentation T1047 Execution

Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model and Windows Remote Management. Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS.

Mitigations: Privileged Account Management, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint, User Account Management, Execution Prevention

MITRE ATT&CK reference

MITRE ATT&CK techniques attributed to Incransom across its recorded activity, not a finding about how ÖVERUM AGRO was reached.

Vulnerabilities Incransom is recorded exploiting

2 of these 2 are in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, 2 of them recorded by CISA as used in ransomware campaigns. CVEs attributed to Incransom across its reported activity. There is no indication that any of these was involved in the ÖVERUM AGRO incident — the source data does not record an entry point.

Incident analysis

ÖVERUM AGRO was listed by Incransom ransomware, a group with 1,040 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on November 12, 2026.

ÖVERUM AGRO is based in Sweden and operates in the Agriculture and Food Production sector. Sweden ranks #20 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 169 victims in this database.

Sector context. Organisations in this sector hold valuable data and operational systems that ransomware groups seek to exploit for financial gain through encryption and data exfiltration.

Incransom typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Frequently asked questions

Was ÖVERUM AGRO attacked by ransomware?

Yes. ÖVERUM AGRO was listed as a victim of the Incransom ransomware group on November 12, 2026. The organisation is based in Sweden and operates in the Agriculture and Food Production sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked ÖVERUM AGRO?

ÖVERUM AGRO was attacked by Incransom ransomware. Incransom is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 1,040 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the ÖVERUM AGRO ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on ÖVERUM AGRO was disclosed on November 12, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the ÖVERUM AGRO ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from ÖVERUM AGRO has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Agriculture and Food Production organisation, ÖVERUM AGRO likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Incransom attacks?

To defend against Incransom and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.