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Cyber Threat
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Ransomware victim Professional Services

acclaimcompanies.com

Listed by Settra on · organisation based in United States

acclaimcompanies.com

Disclosed
Oct 18, 2026
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Settra
115 victims listed
Country
United States
#1 most targeted
Sector
Professional Services

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Settra. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

Settra listed acclaimcompanies.com on its dark web leak site on 18 October 2026. The platform exposes Social Security Numbers of executives Gerald C. Johnson Jr. and Mark C. Johnson in corporate documents.

About acclaimcompanies.com

The Social Security Numbers of both group executives — Gerald C. Johnson Jr. and Mark C. Johnson — are fully exposed in corporate documents (IRS Form SS-4). The Johnson Family Trust holds an investment portfolio of $1.67 million at First Republic Bank against a margin loan of $280K, while parent company Acclaim Asset Management simultaneously received two different EINs from the IRS — per CP212 notice (January 2025). Baboo Properties LLC, in which Mark C. Johnson is a member, failed to file the required Form 940 for 2015, despite receiving IRS notice CP080. A corporate network of 15+ legal ent

Source record: ransomware.live

About the Settra group

Settra has listed 85 victims since June 2026.

Incident analysis

acclaimcompanies.com was listed by Settra ransomware, a group with 115 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on October 18, 2026.

acclaimcompanies.com is based in United States and operates in the Professional Services sector. United States ranks #1 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 10,084 victims in this database.

Sector context. Organisations in this sector hold valuable data and operational systems that ransomware groups seek to exploit for financial gain through encryption and data exfiltration.

Settra typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was acclaimcompanies.com attacked by ransomware?

Yes. acclaimcompanies.com was listed as a victim of the Settra ransomware group on October 18, 2026. The organisation is based in United States and operates in the Professional Services sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked acclaimcompanies.com?

acclaimcompanies.com was attacked by Settra ransomware. Settra is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 115 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the acclaimcompanies.com ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on acclaimcompanies.com was disclosed on October 18, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the acclaimcompanies.com ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from acclaimcompanies.com has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Professional Services organisation, acclaimcompanies.com likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Settra attacks?

To defend against Settra and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.