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Cyber Threat
CTI Academy Sponsor CTI Academy
Ransomware victim Public Sector

Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids

Listed by Blacksuit on · organisation based in United States

tobaccofreekids.org

Disclosed
Feb 5, 2024
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Blacksuit
165 victims listed
Country
United States
#1 most targeted
Sector
Public Sector

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Blacksuit. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About the Blacksuit group

Blacksuit has listed 184 victims since June 2023.

How Blacksuit is documented to operate

External Remote Services T1133 Persistence Initial Access

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally. Access to Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.

Mitigations: Limit Access to Resource Over Network, Restrict Web-Based Content, Network Segmentation, Multi-factor Authentication, Disable or Remove Feature or Program

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Initial Access

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration. Exploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet-accessible open sockets. On ESXi infrastructure, adversaries may exploit exposed OpenSLP services; they may alternatively exploit exposed VMware vCenter servers.

Mitigations: Vulnerability Scanning, Limit Access to Resource Over Network, Filter Network Traffic, Network Segmentation, Privileged Account Management, Application Isolation and Sandboxing

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Phishing T1566 Initial Access

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms.

Mitigations: Network Intrusion Prevention, Restrict Web-Based Content, User Training, Antivirus/Antimalware, Software Configuration, Audit

MITRE ATT&CK reference

MITRE ATT&CK techniques attributed to Blacksuit across its recorded activity, not a finding about how Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids was reached.

Incident analysis

Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids was listed by Blacksuit ransomware, a group with 165 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on February 5, 2024.

Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids is based in United States and operates in the Public Sector sector. United States ranks #1 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 10,141 victims in this database.

Sector context. Organisations in this sector hold valuable data and operational systems that ransomware groups seek to exploit for financial gain through encryption and data exfiltration.

Blacksuit typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids was listed as a victim of the Blacksuit ransomware group on February 5, 2024. The organisation is based in United States and operates in the Public Sector sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids?

Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids was attacked by Blacksuit ransomware. Blacksuit is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 165 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids was disclosed on February 5, 2024. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Public Sector organisation, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Blacksuit attacks?

To defend against Blacksuit and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.