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Cyber Threat
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Ransomware victim Other

Charles E. Tabor AAL LLC

Listed by Rhysida on · organisation based in United States

Disclosed
Oct 11, 2026
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Rhysida
226 victims listed
Country
United States
#1 most targeted
Sector
Other

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Rhysida. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

Rhysida listed Charles E. Tabor AAL LLC on its dark web leak site operated by Rhysida on 11 October 2026. Charles E. Tabor AAL LLC is based in United States.

About the Rhysida group

Rhysida is a ransomware-as-a-service (RAAS) group that emerged in May 2023. The group utilizes a namesake ransomware through phishing attacks and Cobalt Strike to breach the targets' networks and deploy their payloads. The group threatens to publicly distribute exfiltrated data if the ransom is not paid, and it's worth mentioning that Rhysida is still in the early stages of development. The ransomware leaves PDF notes in the affected folders, instructing victims to contact the group through its portal, and payment is made via Bitcoin. After encryption, the ransomware appends the extension '.ryshida' to encrypted files. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs Rhysida has listed 295 victims since June 2023.

How Rhysida is documented to operate

Phishing T1566 Initial Access

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms.

Mitigations: Network Intrusion Prevention, Restrict Web-Based Content, User Training, Antivirus/Antimalware, Software Configuration, Audit

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059 Execution

Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell. There are also cross-platform interpreters such as Python, as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as JavaScript and Visual Basic.

Mitigations: Restrict Web-Based Content, Limit Software Installation, Execution Prevention, Code Signing, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint, Privileged Account Management

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Shared Modules T1129 Execution

Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. Shared modules are executable files that are loaded into processes to provide access to reusable code, such as specific custom functions or invoking OS API functions (i.e., Native API). Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, adversaries can modularize functionality of their malware into shared objects that perform various functions such as managing C2 network communications or execution of specific actions on objective. The Linux & macOS module loader can load and execute shared objects from arbitrary local paths.

Mitigations: Execution Prevention

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1547.001 Persistence Privilege Escalation

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Process Injection T1055 Stealth Privilege Escalation

Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. There are many different ways to inject code into a process, many of which abuse legitimate functionalities.

Mitigations: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint, Privileged Account Management

MITRE ATT&CK reference

MITRE ATT&CK techniques attributed to Rhysida across its recorded activity, not a finding about how Charles E. Tabor AAL LLC was reached.

Vulnerabilities Rhysida is recorded exploiting

5 of these 5 are in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, 5 of them recorded by CISA as used in ransomware campaigns. CVEs attributed to Rhysida across its reported activity. There is no indication that any of these was involved in the Charles E. Tabor AAL LLC incident — the source data does not record an entry point.

Incident analysis

Charles E. Tabor AAL LLC was listed by Rhysida ransomware, a group with 226 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on October 11, 2026.

Charles E. Tabor AAL LLC is based in United States and operates in the Other sector. United States ranks #1 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 9,975 victims in this database.

Sector context. Organisations in this sector hold valuable data and operational systems that ransomware groups seek to exploit for financial gain through encryption and data exfiltration.

Rhysida typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was Charles E. Tabor AAL LLC attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Charles E. Tabor AAL LLC was listed as a victim of the Rhysida ransomware group on October 11, 2026. The organisation is based in United States and operates in the Other sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Charles E. Tabor AAL LLC?

Charles E. Tabor AAL LLC was attacked by Rhysida ransomware. Rhysida is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 226 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Charles E. Tabor AAL LLC ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Charles E. Tabor AAL LLC was disclosed on October 11, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Charles E. Tabor AAL LLC ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Charles E. Tabor AAL LLC has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Other organisation, Charles E. Tabor AAL LLC likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Rhysida attacks?

To defend against Rhysida and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.