CI
Ransomware Victim Government & Defense

City Government of Baguio

Ransomware attack by Emperador ยท Disclosed August 12, 2026 ยท ๐Ÿ‡ต๐Ÿ‡ญ Philippines

baguio.gov.ph

Date Disclosed
Aug 12, 2026
2026
Threat Group
Emperador
16 total victims
Industry
Government & Defense

ThreatAI Analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Emperador. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

Emperador listed City Government of Baguio on its dark web leak site on 12 August 2026, which is based in the Philippines and operates in the Government & Defense sector.

About the Emperador group

Emperador has listed 15 victims since August 2026.

Vulnerabilities Emperador is recorded exploiting

5 of these 5 are in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, 5 of them recorded by CISA as used in ransomware campaigns. CVEs attributed to Emperador across its reported activity. There is no indication that any of these was involved in the City Government of Baguio incident โ€” the source data does not record an entry point.

Incident Analysis

City Government of Baguio was targeted by Emperador ransomware, one of the most active ransomware groups in our database with 16 confirmed victims globally. The attack was disclosed on August 12, 2026, when City Government of Baguio appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

City Government of Baguio is based in Philippines , operating in the Government & Defense sector. Philippines ranks #34 globally for ransomware attacks, with 74 victims in our database.

Sector context: Organisations in this sector hold valuable data and operational systems that ransomware groups seek to exploit for financial gain through encryption and data exfiltration.

Emperador typically employs a double extortion model: first exfiltrating sensitive data from the victim's systems, then deploying ransomware to encrypt files. Victims face two simultaneous threats โ€” paying to restore access and paying to prevent publication of stolen data. The group's leak site publishes victim names and exfiltrated data as leverage.

Data source: This incident record is sourced from public ransomware group leak site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. Disclosure date reflects when the victim was published on the leak site, which may differ from the initial date of compromise. This platform does not publish or link to stolen data. Last data update: Sep 11, 2026 22:00 UTC.

Frequently Asked Questions

Was City Government of Baguio attacked by ransomware?

Yes. City Government of Baguio was listed as a victim of the Emperador ransomware group on August 12, 2026. The organisation is based in Philippines and operates in the Government & Defense sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked City Government of Baguio?

City Government of Baguio was attacked by Emperador ransomware. Emperador is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 16 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the City Government of Baguio ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on City Government of Baguio was disclosed on August 12, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the City Government of Baguio ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from City Government of Baguio has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Government & Defense organisation, City Government of Baguio likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Emperador attacks?

To defend against Emperador and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.