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Cyber Threat
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Ransomware victim Healthcare

huisartsencentrumkleiniterson.nl

Listed by Lockbit5 on · organisation based in Netherlands

huisartsencentrumkleiniterson.nl

Disclosed
Sep 4, 2026
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Lockbit5
385 victims listed
Country
Netherlands
#23 most targeted
Sector
Healthcare

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Lockbit5. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About huisartsencentrumkleiniterson.nl

Huisartsencentrum Klein Iterson is a Healthcare Services provider operating in the primary medical c...

Source record: ransomware.live

About the Lockbit5 group

LockBit 5.0 ("ChuongDong") emerged in September 2025 as the group's resurgence following the February 2024 law enforcement takedown, introducing cross-platform payloads targeting Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi with enhanced evasion capabilities and continuing the RaaS affiliate model of its predecessors. Lockbit5 has listed 374 victims since April 2023.

Incident analysis

huisartsencentrumkleiniterson.nl was listed by Lockbit5 ransomware, a group with 385 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on September 4, 2026.

huisartsencentrumkleiniterson.nl is based in Netherlands and operates in the Healthcare sector. Netherlands ranks #23 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 142 victims in this database.

Sector context. Healthcare organisations are high-value ransomware targets because patient data is extremely sensitive, regulatory penalties for breaches are severe, and operational downtime can threaten patient safety — all factors that increase ransom payment pressure.

Lockbit5 typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was huisartsencentrumkleiniterson.nl attacked by ransomware?

Yes. huisartsencentrumkleiniterson.nl was listed as a victim of the Lockbit5 ransomware group on September 4, 2026. The organisation is based in Netherlands and operates in the Healthcare sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked huisartsencentrumkleiniterson.nl?

huisartsencentrumkleiniterson.nl was attacked by Lockbit5 ransomware. Lockbit5 is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 385 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the huisartsencentrumkleiniterson.nl ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on huisartsencentrumkleiniterson.nl was disclosed on September 4, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the huisartsencentrumkleiniterson.nl ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from huisartsencentrumkleiniterson.nl has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Healthcare organisation, huisartsencentrumkleiniterson.nl likely held patient records, medical data, and personally identifiable information (PII).

How can organisations protect against Lockbit5 attacks?

To defend against Lockbit5 and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.