Skip to content
Cyber Threat
CTI Academy Sponsor CTI Academy
Ransomware victim Transportation/Logistics

Luis Garratón

Listed by Sinobi on · organisation based in Puerto Rico

Disclosed
Oct 27, 2025
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Sinobi
274 victims listed
Country
Puerto Rico
#63 most targeted
Sector
Transportation/Logistics

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Sinobi. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About the Sinobi group

Sinobi is a private vetted-affiliate RaaS group that emerged in mid-2025, believed to be a rebrand of the Lynx/INC ransomware lineage, claiming 176 victims by end of 2025 through double-extortion attacks primarily against mid-market US organizations via compromised SonicWall VPN credentials. Sinobi has listed 274 victims since March 2025.

How Sinobi is documented to operate

Valid Accounts T1078 Stealth Persistence

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network.

Mitigations: Application Developer Guidance, User Training, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, Multi-factor Authentication

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Initial Access

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration. Exploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet-accessible open sockets. On ESXi infrastructure, adversaries may exploit exposed OpenSLP services; they may alternatively exploit exposed VMware vCenter servers.

Mitigations: Vulnerability Scanning, Limit Access to Resource Over Network, Filter Network Traffic, Network Segmentation, Privileged Account Management, Application Isolation and Sandboxing

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Phishing T1566 Initial Access

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms.

Mitigations: Network Intrusion Prevention, Restrict Web-Based Content, User Training, Antivirus/Antimalware, Software Configuration, Audit

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Native API T1106 Execution

Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes. These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations. Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors.

Mitigations: Execution Prevention, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK reference

MITRE ATT&CK techniques attributed to Sinobi across its recorded activity, not a finding about how Luis Garratón was reached.

Vulnerabilities Sinobi is recorded exploiting

3 of these 3 are in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, 3 of them recorded by CISA as used in ransomware campaigns. CVEs attributed to Sinobi across its reported activity. There is no indication that any of these was involved in the Luis Garratón incident — the source data does not record an entry point.

Incident analysis

Luis Garratón was listed by Sinobi ransomware, a group with 274 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on October 27, 2025.

Luis Garratón is based in Puerto Rico and operates in the Transportation/Logistics sector. Puerto Rico ranks #63 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 21 victims in this database.

Sector context. Logistics companies are targeted because supply chain disruption has cascading effects on customers and partners, amplifying pressure to pay ransoms quickly to restore operations.

Sinobi typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was Luis Garratón attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Luis Garratón was listed as a victim of the Sinobi ransomware group on October 27, 2025. The organisation is based in Puerto Rico and operates in the Transportation/Logistics sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Luis Garratón?

Luis Garratón was attacked by Sinobi ransomware. Sinobi is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 274 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Luis Garratón ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Luis Garratón was disclosed on October 27, 2025. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Luis Garratón ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Luis Garratón has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Transportation/Logistics organisation, Luis Garratón likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Sinobi attacks?

To defend against Sinobi and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.