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Cyber Threat
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Ransomware victim Professional Services

Massey, Stotser & Nichols

Listed by Insomnia on · organisation based in United States

www.msnattorneys.com

Disclosed
Sep 14, 2026
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Insomnia
59 victims listed
Country
United States
#1 most targeted
Sector
Professional Services

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Insomnia. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About Massey, Stotser & Nichols

Massey, Stotser & Nichols is a Birmingham, AL law firm offering real estate, family law, and civil/corporate litigation. They serve Fortune 500, businesses, and individuals, delivering personalized solutions with big-firm capability.

Source record: ransomware.live

About the Insomnia group

Insomnia is a data-theft and extortion group that emerged in October 2025, targeting primarily US-based healthcare organizations — stealing patient files and threatening public exposure rather than encrypting files — and avoiding former Soviet states, consistent with Russian-speaking cybercrime norms. Insomnia has listed 53 victims since February 2025.

Incident analysis

Massey, Stotser & Nichols was listed by Insomnia ransomware, a group with 59 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on September 14, 2026.

Massey, Stotser & Nichols is based in United States and operates in the Professional Services sector. United States ranks #1 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 9,972 victims in this database.

Sector context. Organisations in this sector hold valuable data and operational systems that ransomware groups seek to exploit for financial gain through encryption and data exfiltration.

Insomnia typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was Massey, Stotser & Nichols attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Massey, Stotser & Nichols was listed as a victim of the Insomnia ransomware group on September 14, 2026. The organisation is based in United States and operates in the Professional Services sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Massey, Stotser & Nichols?

Massey, Stotser & Nichols was attacked by Insomnia ransomware. Insomnia is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 59 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Massey, Stotser & Nichols ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Massey, Stotser & Nichols was disclosed on September 14, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Massey, Stotser & Nichols ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Massey, Stotser & Nichols has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Professional Services organisation, Massey, Stotser & Nichols likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Insomnia attacks?

To defend against Insomnia and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.