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Ransomware Victim Transportation/Logistics

Nihon Kotsu Co., Ltd.

Ransomware attack by Ailock · Disclosed July 15, 2026 · 🇯🇵 Japan

nihon-kotsu.co.jp

Date Disclosed
Jul 15, 2026
2026
Threat Group
Ailock
51 total victims
Country
🇯🇵 Japan
Industry
Transportation/Logistics

ThreatAI Analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Ailock. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About Nihon Kotsu Co., Ltd.

Nihon Kotsu Co., Ltd. is the largest taxi and limousine operator in Japan. For the fiscal year ending May 2025, the company reported an annual consolidated revenue of ¥103.445 billion, with group and partner company sales reaching ¥155.457 billion.

Source record: ransomware.live

About the Ailock group

AiLock is a ransomware operation that emerged in early 2025, marketing itself as AI-assisted ransomware using a hybrid ChaCha20/NTRUEncrypt encryption scheme and double-extortion tactics, actively recruiting affiliates and threatening regulatory reporting if ransoms are unpaid. Ailock has listed 47 victims since April 2015.

Incident Analysis

Nihon Kotsu Co., Ltd. was targeted by Ailock ransomware, one of the most active ransomware groups in our database with 51 confirmed victims globally. The attack was disclosed on July 15, 2026, when Nihon Kotsu Co., Ltd. appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Nihon Kotsu Co., Ltd. is based in Japan , operating in the Transportation/Logistics sector. Japan ranks #11 globally for ransomware attacks, with 266 victims in our database.

Sector context: Logistics companies are targeted because supply chain disruption has cascading effects on customers and partners, amplifying pressure to pay ransoms quickly to restore operations.

Ailock typically employs a double extortion model: first exfiltrating sensitive data from the victim's systems, then deploying ransomware to encrypt files. Victims face two simultaneous threats — paying to restore access and paying to prevent publication of stolen data. The group's leak site publishes victim names and exfiltrated data as leverage.

Data source: This incident record is sourced from public ransomware group leak site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. Disclosure date reflects when the victim was published on the leak site, which may differ from the initial date of compromise. This platform does not publish or link to stolen data. Last data update: Sep 5, 2026 18:00 UTC.

Frequently Asked Questions

Was Nihon Kotsu Co., Ltd. attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Nihon Kotsu Co., Ltd. was listed as a victim of the Ailock ransomware group on July 15, 2026. The organisation is based in Japan and operates in the Transportation/Logistics sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Nihon Kotsu Co., Ltd.?

Nihon Kotsu Co., Ltd. was attacked by Ailock ransomware. Ailock is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 51 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Nihon Kotsu Co., Ltd. ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Nihon Kotsu Co., Ltd. was disclosed on July 15, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Nihon Kotsu Co., Ltd. ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Nihon Kotsu Co., Ltd. has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Transportation/Logistics organisation, Nihon Kotsu Co., Ltd. likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Ailock attacks?

To defend against Ailock and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.