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Cyber Threat
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Ransomware victim Public Sector

PalauGov

Listed by Dragonforce on · organisation based in Palau

palaugov.pw

Disclosed
Apr 7, 2024
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Dragonforce
655 victims listed
Country
Palau
#142 most targeted
Sector
Public Sector

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Dragonforce. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About the Dragonforce group

DragonForce is a major ransomware-as-a-service operation first observed in August 2023 that launched a formal affiliate program offering 80% revenue share, then rebranded as a "ransomware cartel" in 2025, gaining notoriety for high-profile attacks on UK retailers Marks & Spencer, Co-op, and Harrods. Dragonforce has listed 659 victims since October 2022.

How Dragonforce is documented to operate

User Execution T1204 Execution

An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing. While User Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.

Mitigations: Network Intrusion Prevention, Restrict Web-Based Content, Limit Software Installation, User Training, Execution Prevention, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK reference
File and Directory Discovery T1083 Discovery

Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include <codedir</code, <codetree</code, <codels</code, <codefind</code, and <codelocate</code. Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the Native API.

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Data Encrypted for Impact T1486 Impact

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Mitigations: Data Backup, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK reference

MITRE ATT&CK techniques attributed to Dragonforce across its recorded activity, not a finding about how PalauGov was reached.

Vulnerabilities Dragonforce is recorded exploiting

6 of these 6 are in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, 6 of them recorded by CISA as used in ransomware campaigns. CVEs attributed to Dragonforce across its reported activity. There is no indication that any of these was involved in the PalauGov incident — the source data does not record an entry point.

Incident analysis

PalauGov was listed by Dragonforce ransomware, a group with 655 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on April 7, 2024.

PalauGov is based in Palau and operates in the Public Sector sector. Palau ranks #142 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 3 victims in this database.

Sector context. Organisations in this sector hold valuable data and operational systems that ransomware groups seek to exploit for financial gain through encryption and data exfiltration.

Dragonforce typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was PalauGov attacked by ransomware?

Yes. PalauGov was listed as a victim of the Dragonforce ransomware group on April 7, 2024. The organisation is based in Palau and operates in the Public Sector sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked PalauGov?

PalauGov was attacked by Dragonforce ransomware. Dragonforce is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 655 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the PalauGov ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on PalauGov was disclosed on April 7, 2024. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the PalauGov ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from PalauGov has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Public Sector organisation, PalauGov likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Dragonforce attacks?

To defend against Dragonforce and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.