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Cyber Threat
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Ransomware victim Manufacturing

pharrusa.com

Listed by Threeam on · organisation based in United States

pharrusa.com

Disclosed
Jan 12, 2024
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Threeam
88 victims listed
Country
United States
#1 most targeted
Sector
Manufacturing

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Threeam. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About the Threeam group

A new Ransomware family identified by the name '3AM' or 'ThreeAM' in September 2023. The ransomware operation was observed by the Symantec team, in which a ransomware affiliate attempted to deploy another ransomware, LockBit, on the target network and then switched to 3AM when LockBit was reportedly blocked. > > The ransomware operation, according to the publication on its Tor-based website, has been operating since mid-August 2023, according to the publication from its first victim. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs Threeam has listed 99 victims since August 2023.

How Threeam is documented to operate

Create Account T1136 Persistence

Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. Accounts may be created on the local system or within a domain or cloud tenant. In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection.

Mitigations: Operating System Configuration, Network Segmentation, Privileged Account Management, Multi-factor Authentication

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Service Execution T1569.002 Execution

Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (<codeservices.exe</code) is an interface to manage and manipulate services. The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as <codesc.exe</code and Net. PsExec can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API. Tools such as PsExec and <codesc.exe</code can accept remote servers as arguments and may be used to conduct remote execution. Adversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content.

Mitigations: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint, Restrict File and Directory Permissions, Privileged Account Management

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Bypass User Account Control T1548.002 Privilege Escalation

Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.

Mitigations: User Account Control, Privileged Account Management, Audit, Update Software

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Remote System Discovery T1018 Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping, <codenet view</code using Net, or, on ESXi servers, esxcli network diag ping. Adversaries may also analyze data from local host files (ex: <codeC:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts</code or <code/etc/hosts</code) or other passive means (such as local Arp cache entries) in order to discover the presence of remote systems in an environment.

MITRE ATT&CK reference

MITRE ATT&CK techniques attributed to Threeam across its recorded activity, not a finding about how pharrusa.com was reached.

Incident analysis

pharrusa.com was listed by Threeam ransomware, a group with 88 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on January 12, 2024.

pharrusa.com is based in United States and operates in the Manufacturing sector. United States ranks #1 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 10,138 victims in this database.

Sector context. Manufacturing companies are frequently targeted because production downtime directly translates to financial loss. Ransomware operators exploit this time-sensitivity to demand higher ransoms and faster payment.

Threeam typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was pharrusa.com attacked by ransomware?

Yes. pharrusa.com was listed as a victim of the Threeam ransomware group on January 12, 2024. The organisation is based in United States and operates in the Manufacturing sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked pharrusa.com?

pharrusa.com was attacked by Threeam ransomware. Threeam is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 88 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the pharrusa.com ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on pharrusa.com was disclosed on January 12, 2024. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the pharrusa.com ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from pharrusa.com has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Manufacturing organisation, pharrusa.com likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Threeam attacks?

To defend against Threeam and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.