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Ransomware Victim Healthcare

Sanderling Healthcare

Ransomware attack by Sarcoma · Disclosed July 23, 2025 · 🇺🇸 United States

sanderlinghealthcare.com

Date Disclosed
Jul 23, 2025
2025
Threat Group
Sarcoma
141 total victims
Country
🇺🇸 United States
Industry
Healthcare

ThreatAI Analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Sarcoma. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About the Sarcoma group

Sarcoma is a ransomware group that debuted in October 2024, immediately ranking among the top three most active groups globally and surpassing 116 documented victims by mid-2025, targeting mid-market companies across manufacturing, retail, healthcare, legal, and business services with roughly 50% of victims in the United States. Sarcoma has listed 141 victims since July 2024.

How Sarcoma is documented to operate

Valid Accounts T1078 Stealth Persistence

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network.

Mitigations: Application Developer Guidance, User Training, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, Multi-factor Authentication

MITRE ATT&CK reference →
Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Initial Access

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration. Exploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet-accessible open sockets. On ESXi infrastructure, adversaries may exploit exposed OpenSLP services; they may alternatively exploit exposed VMware vCenter servers.

Mitigations: Vulnerability Scanning, Limit Access to Resource Over Network, Filter Network Traffic, Network Segmentation, Privileged Account Management, Application Isolation and Sandboxing

MITRE ATT&CK reference →
Trusted Relationship T1199 Initial Access

Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network. Organizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security).

Mitigations: Network Segmentation, User Account Management, Multi-factor Authentication

MITRE ATT&CK reference →
Phishing T1566 Initial Access

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms.

Mitigations: Network Intrusion Prevention, Restrict Web-Based Content, User Training, Antivirus/Antimalware, Software Configuration, Audit

MITRE ATT&CK reference →
Scheduled Task/Job T1053 Execution Persistence

Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system. Adversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.

Mitigations: Operating System Configuration, User Account Management, Restrict File and Directory Permissions, Privileged Account Management, Audit

MITRE ATT&CK reference →

MITRE ATT&CK techniques attributed to Sarcoma across its recorded activity, not a finding about how Sanderling Healthcare was reached.

Incident Analysis

Sanderling Healthcare was targeted by Sarcoma ransomware, one of the most active ransomware groups in our database with 141 confirmed victims globally. The attack was disclosed on July 23, 2025, when Sanderling Healthcare appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Sanderling Healthcare is based in United States , operating in the Healthcare sector. United States ranks #1 globally for ransomware attacks, with 9,476 victims in our database.

Sector context: Healthcare organisations are high-value ransomware targets because patient data is extremely sensitive, regulatory penalties for breaches are severe, and operational downtime can threaten patient safety — all factors that increase ransom payment pressure.

Sarcoma typically employs a double extortion model: first exfiltrating sensitive data from the victim's systems, then deploying ransomware to encrypt files. Victims face two simultaneous threats — paying to restore access and paying to prevent publication of stolen data. The group's leak site publishes victim names and exfiltrated data as leverage.

Data source: This incident record is sourced from public ransomware group leak site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. Disclosure date reflects when the victim was published on the leak site, which may differ from the initial date of compromise. This platform does not publish or link to stolen data. Last data update: Sep 12, 2026 16:00 UTC.

Frequently Asked Questions

Was Sanderling Healthcare attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Sanderling Healthcare was listed as a victim of the Sarcoma ransomware group on July 23, 2025. The organisation is based in United States and operates in the Healthcare sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Sanderling Healthcare?

Sanderling Healthcare was attacked by Sarcoma ransomware. Sarcoma is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 141 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Sanderling Healthcare ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Sanderling Healthcare was disclosed on July 23, 2025. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Sanderling Healthcare ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Sanderling Healthcare has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Healthcare organisation, Sanderling Healthcare likely held patient records, medical data, and personally identifiable information (PII).

How can organisations protect against Sarcoma attacks?

To defend against Sarcoma and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.