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Cyber Threat
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Ransomware victim Transportation/Logistics

Ship Services

Listed by Akira on · organisation based in Norway

wilhelmsen.com

Disclosed
Nov 20, 2024
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Akira
1,522 victims listed
Country
Norway
#45 most targeted
Sector
Transportation/Logistics

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Akira. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About the Akira group

The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption fla Akira has listed 1,632 victims since April 2023.

How Akira is documented to operate

Valid Accounts T1078 Stealth Persistence

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network.

Mitigations: Application Developer Guidance, User Training, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, Multi-factor Authentication

MITRE ATT&CK reference
External Remote Services T1133 Persistence Initial Access

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally. Access to Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.

Mitigations: Limit Access to Resource Over Network, Restrict Web-Based Content, Network Segmentation, Multi-factor Authentication, Disable or Remove Feature or Program

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Initial Access

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration. Exploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet-accessible open sockets. On ESXi infrastructure, adversaries may exploit exposed OpenSLP services; they may alternatively exploit exposed VMware vCenter servers.

Mitigations: Vulnerability Scanning, Limit Access to Resource Over Network, Filter Network Traffic, Network Segmentation, Privileged Account Management, Application Isolation and Sandboxing

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Windows Management Instrumentation T1047 Execution

Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model and Windows Remote Management. Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS.

Mitigations: Execution Prevention, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059 Execution

Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell. There are also cross-platform interpreters such as Python, as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as JavaScript and Visual Basic.

Mitigations: Restrict Web-Based Content, Limit Software Installation, Execution Prevention, Code Signing, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint, Privileged Account Management

MITRE ATT&CK reference

MITRE ATT&CK techniques attributed to Akira across its recorded activity, not a finding about how Ship Services was reached.

Vulnerabilities Akira is recorded exploiting

6 of these 6 are in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, 6 of them recorded by CISA as used in ransomware campaigns. CVEs attributed to Akira across its reported activity. There is no indication that any of these was involved in the Ship Services incident — the source data does not record an entry point.

Incident analysis

Ship Services was listed by Akira ransomware, a group with 1,522 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on November 20, 2024.

Ship Services is based in Norway and operates in the Transportation/Logistics sector. Norway ranks #45 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 57 victims in this database.

Sector context. Logistics companies are targeted because supply chain disruption has cascading effects on customers and partners, amplifying pressure to pay ransoms quickly to restore operations.

Akira typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was Ship Services attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Ship Services was listed as a victim of the Akira ransomware group on November 20, 2024. The organisation is based in Norway and operates in the Transportation/Logistics sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Ship Services?

Ship Services was attacked by Akira ransomware. Akira is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 1,522 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Ship Services ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Ship Services was disclosed on November 20, 2024. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Ship Services ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Ship Services has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Transportation/Logistics organisation, Ship Services likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Akira attacks?

To defend against Akira and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.