Skip to content
Cyber Threat
CTI Academy Sponsor CTI Academy
Ransomware victim Education

Spirit Cultural Exchange - US

Listed by Kazu on · organisation based in United States

www.spiritexchange.com

Disclosed
Sep 5, 2026
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Kazu
22 victims listed
Country
United States
#1 most targeted
Sector
Education

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Kazu. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About Spirit Cultural Exchange - US

Spirit Cultural Exchange is a U.S.-based organization that provides international cultural exchange and J-1 visa programs for students, young professionals, teachers, and international participants. Its programs include Summer Work and Travel, internships, professional training, and teaching opportunities in the United States

Source record: ransomware.live

About the Kazu group

Kazu is an emerging ransomware group active since September 2025 that employs double-extortion tactics, targeting government, healthcare, and financial organizations primarily in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, with notable claimed breaches including Dubai's Ports, Customs and Free Zone Corporation with 1.94 TB exfiltrated. Kazu has listed 20 victims since November 2025.

Incident analysis

Spirit Cultural Exchange - US was listed by Kazu ransomware, a group with 22 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on September 5, 2026.

Spirit Cultural Exchange - US is based in United States and operates in the Education sector. United States ranks #1 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 10,141 victims in this database.

Sector context. Educational institutions often have under-resourced IT security teams and hold large amounts of student and faculty personal data, making them attractive targets for ransomware groups.

Kazu typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was Spirit Cultural Exchange - US attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Spirit Cultural Exchange - US was listed as a victim of the Kazu ransomware group on September 5, 2026. The organisation is based in United States and operates in the Education sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Spirit Cultural Exchange - US?

Spirit Cultural Exchange - US was attacked by Kazu ransomware. Kazu is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 22 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Spirit Cultural Exchange - US ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Spirit Cultural Exchange - US was disclosed on September 5, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Spirit Cultural Exchange - US ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Spirit Cultural Exchange - US has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Education organisation, Spirit Cultural Exchange - US likely held student and faculty personal data and academic records.

How can organisations protect against Kazu attacks?

To defend against Kazu and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.