ST
Ransomware Victim Healthcare

St. Francis Healthcare Systems of Hawaii

Ransomware attack by Wallstreet Β· Disclosed October 3, 2026 Β· πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡Έ United States

stfrancishawaii.org

Date Disclosed
Oct 3, 2026
2026
Threat Group
Wallstreet
39 total victims
Industry
Healthcare

ThreatAI Analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Wallstreet. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

St. Francis Healthcare Systems of Hawaii was listed on Wallstreet's dark web leak site on 3 October 2026; the Catholic nonprofit organization serves families in Hawaii.

About St. Francis Healthcare Systems of Hawaii

St. Francis Healthcare System of HawaiΚ»i is a Catholic, nonprofit healthcare organization that has served HawaiΚ»i families since 1927

Source record: ransomware.live

About the Wallstreet group

Wallstreet has listed 12 victims since June 2026.

Incident Analysis

St. Francis Healthcare Systems of Hawaii was targeted by Wallstreet ransomware, one of the most active ransomware groups in our database with 39 confirmed victims globally. The attack was disclosed on October 3, 2026, when St. Francis Healthcare Systems of Hawaii appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

St. Francis Healthcare Systems of Hawaii is based in United States , operating in the Healthcare sector. United States ranks #1 globally for ransomware attacks, with 9,914 victims in our database.

Sector context: Healthcare organisations are high-value ransomware targets because patient data is extremely sensitive, regulatory penalties for breaches are severe, and operational downtime can threaten patient safety β€” all factors that increase ransom payment pressure.

Wallstreet typically employs a double extortion model: first exfiltrating sensitive data from the victim's systems, then deploying ransomware to encrypt files. Victims face two simultaneous threats β€” paying to restore access and paying to prevent publication of stolen data. The group's leak site publishes victim names and exfiltrated data as leverage.

Data source: This incident record is sourced from public ransomware group leak site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. Disclosure date reflects when the victim was published on the leak site, which may differ from the initial date of compromise. This platform does not publish or link to stolen data. Last data update: Oct 6, 2026 16:00 UTC.

Frequently Asked Questions

Was St. Francis Healthcare Systems of Hawaii attacked by ransomware?

Yes. St. Francis Healthcare Systems of Hawaii was listed as a victim of the Wallstreet ransomware group on October 3, 2026. The organisation is based in United States and operates in the Healthcare sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked St. Francis Healthcare Systems of Hawaii?

St. Francis Healthcare Systems of Hawaii was attacked by Wallstreet ransomware. Wallstreet is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 39 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the St. Francis Healthcare Systems of Hawaii ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on St. Francis Healthcare Systems of Hawaii was disclosed on October 3, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the St. Francis Healthcare Systems of Hawaii ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from St. Francis Healthcare Systems of Hawaii has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Healthcare organisation, St. Francis Healthcare Systems of Hawaii likely held patient records, medical data, and personally identifiable information (PII).

How can organisations protect against Wallstreet attacks?

To defend against Wallstreet and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.