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Cyber Threat
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Ransomware victim Professional Services

Studio Stelitano e Associati

Listed by Emperador on · organisation based in Italy

Disclosed
Oct 30, 2026
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Emperador
81 victims listed
Country
Italy
#5 most targeted
Sector
Professional Services

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Emperador. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About Studio Stelitano e Associati

Studio Stelitano e Associati Italian professional consulting firm based in Bologna (Italy) Labor Law and HR Administration The archive contains the most important personal data and customer data [Sector: Finance]

Source record: ransomware.live

About the Emperador group

Emperador has listed 38 victims since August 2026.

Vulnerabilities Emperador is recorded exploiting

5 of these 5 are in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, 5 of them recorded by CISA as used in ransomware campaigns. CVEs attributed to Emperador across its reported activity. There is no indication that any of these was involved in the Studio Stelitano e Associati incident — the source data does not record an entry point.

Incident analysis

Studio Stelitano e Associati was listed by Emperador ransomware, a group with 81 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on October 30, 2026.

Studio Stelitano e Associati is based in Italy and operates in the Professional Services sector. Italy ranks #5 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 625 victims in this database.

Sector context. Organisations in this sector hold valuable data and operational systems that ransomware groups seek to exploit for financial gain through encryption and data exfiltration.

Emperador typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was Studio Stelitano e Associati attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Studio Stelitano e Associati was listed as a victim of the Emperador ransomware group on October 30, 2026. The organisation is based in Italy and operates in the Professional Services sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Studio Stelitano e Associati?

Studio Stelitano e Associati was attacked by Emperador ransomware. Emperador is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 81 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Studio Stelitano e Associati ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Studio Stelitano e Associati was disclosed on October 30, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Studio Stelitano e Associati ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Studio Stelitano e Associati has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Professional Services organisation, Studio Stelitano e Associati likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Emperador attacks?

To defend against Emperador and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.