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Cyber Threat
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Ransomware victim Energy & Utilities

SunTechnics Fabrisolar AG

Listed by N0n on · organisation based in Switzerland

Disclosed
Oct 23, 2026
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
N0n
168 victims listed
Country
Switzerland
#13 most targeted
Sector
Energy & Utilities

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for N0n. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About the N0n group

N0n has listed 116 victims since September 2026.

How N0n is documented to operate

Valid Accounts T1078 Stealth Persistence

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network.

Mitigations: Application Developer Guidance, User Training, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, Multi-factor Authentication

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059 Execution

Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell. There are also cross-platform interpreters such as Python, as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as JavaScript and Visual Basic.

Mitigations: Restrict Web-Based Content, Limit Software Installation, Execution Prevention, Code Signing, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint, Privileged Account Management

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution T1547 Persistence Privilege Escalation

Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon. These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Obfuscated Files or Information T1027 Stealth

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses. Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information for User Execution. The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary.

Mitigations: User Training, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint, Antivirus/Antimalware, Audit

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Data Staged T1074 Collection

Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location. In cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may Create Cloud Instance and stage data in that instance.

MITRE ATT&CK reference

MITRE ATT&CK techniques attributed to N0n across its recorded activity, not a finding about how SunTechnics Fabrisolar AG was reached.

Incident analysis

SunTechnics Fabrisolar AG was listed by N0n ransomware, a group with 168 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on October 23, 2026.

SunTechnics Fabrisolar AG is based in Switzerland and operates in the Energy & Utilities sector. Switzerland ranks #13 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 223 victims in this database.

Sector context. Organisations in this sector hold valuable data and operational systems that ransomware groups seek to exploit for financial gain through encryption and data exfiltration.

N0n typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was SunTechnics Fabrisolar AG attacked by ransomware?

Yes. SunTechnics Fabrisolar AG was listed as a victim of the N0n ransomware group on October 23, 2026. The organisation is based in Switzerland and operates in the Energy & Utilities sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked SunTechnics Fabrisolar AG?

SunTechnics Fabrisolar AG was attacked by N0n ransomware. N0n is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 168 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the SunTechnics Fabrisolar AG ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on SunTechnics Fabrisolar AG was disclosed on October 23, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the SunTechnics Fabrisolar AG ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from SunTechnics Fabrisolar AG has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Energy & Utilities organisation, SunTechnics Fabrisolar AG likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against N0n attacks?

To defend against N0n and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.