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Ransomware victim Transportation/Logistics

This entry has been removed following a request from the company.

Listed by Hunters on · organisation based in Belgium

Disclosed
May 28, 2024
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Hunters
282 victims listed
Country
Belgium
#26 most targeted
Sector
Transportation/Logistics

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Hunters. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About the Hunters group

In mid-October 2023, just a few days before the Europol operation, the source code of the Ransomware Hive was sold, along with its website and older versions developed in Golang and C (although this purchase has only been reported by the actors without concrete evidence). The buyer of this new source code was the group Hunters International, who claimed to have fixed the bugs in the Ransomware Hive that were responsible for preventing file decryption in some cases. The group also stated that file encryption would not be their primary focus; instead, they would use data theft as a method to pressure victims during extortion attempts. Hunters has listed 307 victims since September 2021.

How Hunters is documented to operate

Native API T1106 Execution

Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes. These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations. Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors.

Mitigations: Execution Prevention, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Shared Modules T1129 Execution

Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. Shared modules are executable files that are loaded into processes to provide access to reusable code, such as specific custom functions or invoking OS API functions (i.e., Native API). Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, adversaries can modularize functionality of their malware into shared objects that perform various functions such as managing C2 network communications or execution of specific actions on objective. The Linux & macOS module loader can load and execute shared objects from arbitrary local paths.

Mitigations: Execution Prevention

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution T1547 Persistence Privilege Escalation

Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon. These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Obfuscated Files or Information T1027 Stealth

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses. Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information for User Execution. The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary.

Mitigations: User Training, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint, Antivirus/Antimalware, Audit

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Process Discovery T1057 Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Administrator or otherwise elevated access may provide better process details. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. In Windows environments, adversaries could obtain details on running processes using the Tasklist utility via cmd or <codeGet-Process</code via PowerShell.

MITRE ATT&CK reference

MITRE ATT&CK techniques attributed to Hunters across its recorded activity, not a finding about how This entry has been removed following a request from the company. was reached.

Incident analysis

This entry has been removed following a request from the company. was listed by Hunters ransomware, a group with 282 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on May 28, 2024.

This entry has been removed following a request from the company. is based in Belgium and operates in the Transportation/Logistics sector. Belgium ranks #26 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 142 victims in this database.

Sector context. Logistics companies are targeted because supply chain disruption has cascading effects on customers and partners, amplifying pressure to pay ransoms quickly to restore operations.

Hunters typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was This entry has been removed following a request from the company. attacked by ransomware?

Yes. This entry has been removed following a request from the company. was listed as a victim of the Hunters ransomware group on May 28, 2024. The organisation is based in Belgium and operates in the Transportation/Logistics sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked This entry has been removed following a request from the company.?

This entry has been removed following a request from the company. was attacked by Hunters ransomware. Hunters is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 282 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the This entry has been removed following a request from the company. ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on This entry has been removed following a request from the company. was disclosed on May 28, 2024. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the This entry has been removed following a request from the company. ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from This entry has been removed following a request from the company. has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Transportation/Logistics organisation, This entry has been removed following a request from the company. likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Hunters attacks?

To defend against Hunters and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.