Cyber Threat Intelligence
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TN
Ransomware Victim Healthcare

tnmed.org

Ransomware attack by Lockbit5 · Disclosed August 28, 2026 · 🇹🇳 TN

tnmed.org

Date Disclosed
Aug 28, 2026
2026
Threat Group
Lockbit5
354 total victims
Country
🇹🇳 TN
Industry
Healthcare

ThreatAI Analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Lockbit5. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

Lockbit5 listed tnmed.org on its dark web leak site on 28 August 2026. The Tennessee Medical Association, a nonprofit advocating for physicians, operates the site.

About tnmed.org

The Tennessee Medical Association is a nonprofit organization that advocates for physicians in Tenne...

Source record: ransomware.live

About the Lockbit5 group

LockBit 5.0 ("ChuongDong") emerged in September 2025 as the group's resurgence following the February 2024 law enforcement takedown, introducing cross-platform payloads targeting Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi with enhanced evasion capabilities and continuing the RaaS affiliate model of its predecessors. Lockbit5 has listed 330 victims since April 2023.

Incident Analysis

tnmed.org was targeted by Lockbit5 ransomware, one of the most active ransomware groups in our database with 354 confirmed victims globally. The attack was disclosed on August 28, 2026, when tnmed.org appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

tnmed.org is based in TN , operating in the Healthcare sector. TN ranks #57 globally for ransomware attacks, with 22 victims in our database.

Sector context: Healthcare organisations are high-value ransomware targets because patient data is extremely sensitive, regulatory penalties for breaches are severe, and operational downtime can threaten patient safety — all factors that increase ransom payment pressure.

Lockbit5 typically employs a double extortion model: first exfiltrating sensitive data from the victim's systems, then deploying ransomware to encrypt files. Victims face two simultaneous threats — paying to restore access and paying to prevent publication of stolen data. The group's leak site publishes victim names and exfiltrated data as leverage.

Data source: This incident record is sourced from public ransomware group leak site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. Disclosure date reflects when the victim was published on the leak site, which may differ from the initial date of compromise. This platform does not publish or link to stolen data. Last data update: Sep 6, 2026 18:00 UTC.

Frequently Asked Questions

Was tnmed.org attacked by ransomware?

Yes. tnmed.org was listed as a victim of the Lockbit5 ransomware group on August 28, 2026. The organisation is based in TN and operates in the Healthcare sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked tnmed.org?

tnmed.org was attacked by Lockbit5 ransomware. Lockbit5 is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 354 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the tnmed.org ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on tnmed.org was disclosed on August 28, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the tnmed.org ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from tnmed.org has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Healthcare organisation, tnmed.org likely held patient records, medical data, and personally identifiable information (PII).

How can organisations protect against Lockbit5 attacks?

To defend against Lockbit5 and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.