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Ransomware Victim Business Services

www.glynmarais.co.za

Ransomware attack by Cactus · Disclosed June 23, 2024 · 🇿🇦 South Africa

glynmarais.co.za

Date Disclosed
Jun 23, 2024
2024
Threat Group
Cactus
157 total victims
Country
🇿🇦 South Africa
Industry
Business Services

ThreatAI Analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Cactus. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About the Cactus group

The CACTUS ransomware is said to have emerged around March 2023. The group became known for exploiting vulnerabilities to gain initial access and maintain a presence within the organization's infrastructure. There is little known information about the ransomware group, except that it emerged on the mentioned date and, following encryption, a text file named 'cAcTuS.readme.txt' would be created. Additionally, encrypted files were altered to the '.cts1' extension, and data exfiltration and victim extortion were conducted through the use of the service known as Tox. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs Cactus has listed 248 victims since July 2023.

How Cactus is documented to operate

Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Initial Access

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration. Exploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet-accessible open sockets. On ESXi infrastructure, adversaries may exploit exposed OpenSLP services; they may alternatively exploit exposed VMware vCenter servers.

Mitigations: Vulnerability Scanning, Limit Access to Resource Over Network, Filter Network Traffic, Network Segmentation, Privileged Account Management, Application Isolation and Sandboxing

MITRE ATT&CK reference →
Software Deployment Tools T1072 Execution Lateral Movement

Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through the network. Configuration management and software deployment applications may be used in an enterprise network or cloud environment for routine administration purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc, and GCP Deployment Manager. Access to network-wide or enterprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adversary to achieve remote code execution on all connected systems.

Mitigations: Remote Data Storage, Limit Software Installation, User Training, Network Segmentation, Password Policies, User Account Management

MITRE ATT&CK reference →
Create Account T1136 Persistence

Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. Accounts may be created on the local system or within a domain or cloud tenant. In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection.

Mitigations: Operating System Configuration, Network Segmentation, Privileged Account Management, Multi-factor Authentication

MITRE ATT&CK reference →
Obfuscated Files or Information T1027 Stealth

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses. Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information for User Execution. The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary.

Mitigations: User Training, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint, Antivirus/Antimalware, Audit

MITRE ATT&CK reference →

MITRE ATT&CK techniques attributed to Cactus across its recorded activity, not a finding about how www.glynmarais.co.za was reached.

Incident Analysis

www.glynmarais.co.za was targeted by Cactus ransomware, one of the most active ransomware groups in our database with 157 confirmed victims globally. The attack was disclosed on June 23, 2024, when www.glynmarais.co.za appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

www.glynmarais.co.za is based in South Africa , operating in the Business Services sector. South Africa ranks #32 globally for ransomware attacks, with 95 victims in our database.

Sector context: Business services firms often have access to multiple client environments, making them high-value pivot points for ransomware operators seeking to maximise impact across multiple victim organisations.

Cactus typically employs a double extortion model: first exfiltrating sensitive data from the victim's systems, then deploying ransomware to encrypt files. Victims face two simultaneous threats — paying to restore access and paying to prevent publication of stolen data. The group's leak site publishes victim names and exfiltrated data as leverage.

Data source: This incident record is sourced from public ransomware group leak site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. Disclosure date reflects when the victim was published on the leak site, which may differ from the initial date of compromise. This platform does not publish or link to stolen data. Last data update: Sep 8, 2026 02:00 UTC.

Frequently Asked Questions

Was www.glynmarais.co.za attacked by ransomware?

Yes. www.glynmarais.co.za was listed as a victim of the Cactus ransomware group on June 23, 2024. The organisation is based in South Africa and operates in the Business Services sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked www.glynmarais.co.za?

www.glynmarais.co.za was attacked by Cactus ransomware. Cactus is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 157 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the www.glynmarais.co.za ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on www.glynmarais.co.za was disclosed on June 23, 2024. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the www.glynmarais.co.za ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from www.glynmarais.co.za has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Business Services organisation, www.glynmarais.co.za likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Cactus attacks?

To defend against Cactus and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.