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Ransomware Victim Retail & E-Commerce

www.jonesthegrocer.com

Ransomware attack by Krybit Β· Disclosed September 24, 2026 Β· πŸ‡¦πŸ‡Ί Australia

www.jonesthegrocer.com

Date Disclosed
Sep 24, 2026
2026
Threat Group
Krybit
156 total victims
Industry
Retail & E-Commerce

ThreatAI Analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Krybit. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

Krybit listed www.jonesthegrocer.com on its dark web leak site on 24 September 2026. Jones the Grocer, a premium gourmet food retail and cafe brand based in Sydney, Australia, operates online.

About www.jonesthegrocer.com

Jones the Grocer is a premium gourmet food retail and cafe brand founded in 1996 in Sydney, Australia, originally launch...

Source record: ransomware.live

About the Krybit group

Krybit is an emerging RaaS group that launched in late March 2026, offering affiliates an 80/20 revenue split with support for Windows, Linux, ESXi, and NAS device encryption, and became notable for a public feud with rival group 0APT in which each breached and leaked the other's operator data. Krybit has listed 134 victims since March 2026.

Incident Analysis

www.jonesthegrocer.com was targeted by Krybit ransomware, one of the most active ransomware groups in our database with 156 confirmed victims globally. The attack was disclosed on September 24, 2026, when www.jonesthegrocer.com appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

www.jonesthegrocer.com is based in Australia , operating in the Retail & E-Commerce sector. Australia ranks #10 globally for ransomware attacks, with 388 victims in our database.

Sector context: Organisations in this sector hold valuable data and operational systems that ransomware groups seek to exploit for financial gain through encryption and data exfiltration.

Krybit typically employs a double extortion model: first exfiltrating sensitive data from the victim's systems, then deploying ransomware to encrypt files. Victims face two simultaneous threats β€” paying to restore access and paying to prevent publication of stolen data. The group's leak site publishes victim names and exfiltrated data as leverage.

Data source: This incident record is sourced from public ransomware group leak site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. Disclosure date reflects when the victim was published on the leak site, which may differ from the initial date of compromise. This platform does not publish or link to stolen data. Last data update: Oct 2, 2026 00:00 UTC.

Frequently Asked Questions

Was www.jonesthegrocer.com attacked by ransomware?

Yes. www.jonesthegrocer.com was listed as a victim of the Krybit ransomware group on September 24, 2026. The organisation is based in Australia and operates in the Retail & E-Commerce sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked www.jonesthegrocer.com?

www.jonesthegrocer.com was attacked by Krybit ransomware. Krybit is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 156 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the www.jonesthegrocer.com ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on www.jonesthegrocer.com was disclosed on September 24, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the www.jonesthegrocer.com ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from www.jonesthegrocer.com has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Retail & E-Commerce organisation, www.jonesthegrocer.com likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Krybit attacks?

To defend against Krybit and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.