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Cyber Threat
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Ransomware victim Manufacturing

www.mercantetubos.com.br

Listed by Alphalocker on · organisation based in Brazil

www.mercantetubos.com.br

Disclosed
Oct 13, 2025
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Alphalocker
31 victims listed
Country
Brazil
#7 most targeted
Sector
Manufacturing

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Alphalocker. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About the Alphalocker group

AlphaLocker is a low-cost ransomware operation built on the EDA2 open-source project that sells affiliates an admin panel, ransomware executable, and decryption key generator, lowering the barrier for entry-level cybercriminals using double-extortion tactics. Alphalocker has listed 31 victims since January 2024.

How Alphalocker is documented to operate

Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Initial Access

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration. Exploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet-accessible open sockets. On ESXi infrastructure, adversaries may exploit exposed OpenSLP services; they may alternatively exploit exposed VMware vCenter servers.

Mitigations: Vulnerability Scanning, Limit Access to Resource Over Network, Filter Network Traffic, Network Segmentation, Privileged Account Management, Application Isolation and Sandboxing

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Phishing T1566 Initial Access

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms.

Mitigations: Network Intrusion Prevention, Restrict Web-Based Content, User Training, Antivirus/Antimalware, Software Configuration, Audit

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Data Encrypted for Impact T1486 Impact

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Mitigations: Data Backup, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK reference

MITRE ATT&CK techniques attributed to Alphalocker across its recorded activity, not a finding about how www.mercantetubos.com.br was reached.

Incident analysis

www.mercantetubos.com.br was listed by Alphalocker ransomware, a group with 31 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on October 13, 2025.

www.mercantetubos.com.br is based in Brazil and operates in the Manufacturing sector. Brazil ranks #7 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 532 victims in this database.

Sector context. Manufacturing companies are frequently targeted because production downtime directly translates to financial loss. Ransomware operators exploit this time-sensitivity to demand higher ransoms and faster payment.

Alphalocker typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was www.mercantetubos.com.br attacked by ransomware?

Yes. www.mercantetubos.com.br was listed as a victim of the Alphalocker ransomware group on October 13, 2025. The organisation is based in Brazil and operates in the Manufacturing sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked www.mercantetubos.com.br?

www.mercantetubos.com.br was attacked by Alphalocker ransomware. Alphalocker is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 31 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the www.mercantetubos.com.br ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on www.mercantetubos.com.br was disclosed on October 13, 2025. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the www.mercantetubos.com.br ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from www.mercantetubos.com.br has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Manufacturing organisation, www.mercantetubos.com.br likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Alphalocker attacks?

To defend against Alphalocker and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.