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Ransomware victim Construction

Zacharia Levi Ltd

Listed by Handala on · organisation based in Israel

Disclosed
Jun 21, 2025
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Handala
175 victims listed
Country
Israel
#23 most targeted
Sector
Construction

This listing in Handala's activity

Organisations Handala named on its leak site each week. The week of this listing is in orange.

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Handala. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About the Handala group

Not a Ransomware Group Handala has listed 175 victims since April 2024.

How Handala is documented to operate

Valid Accounts T1078 Stealth Persistence

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network.

Mitigations: Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, Multi-factor Authentication, Application Developer Guidance, User Training

MITRE ATT&CK reference
External Remote Services T1133 Persistence Initial Access

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally. Access to Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.

Mitigations: Restrict Web-Based Content, Network Segmentation, Disable or Remove Feature or Program, Limit Access to Resource Over Network, Multi-factor Authentication

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Initial Access

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration. Exploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet-accessible open sockets. On ESXi infrastructure, adversaries may exploit exposed OpenSLP services; they may alternatively exploit exposed VMware vCenter servers.

Mitigations: Application Isolation and Sandboxing, Filter Network Traffic, Network Segmentation, Vulnerability Scanning, Privileged Account Management, Exploit Protection

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Trusted Relationship T1199 Initial Access

Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network. Organizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security).

Mitigations: Multi-factor Authentication, User Account Management, Network Segmentation

MITRE ATT&CK reference

MITRE ATT&CK techniques attributed to Handala across its recorded activity, not a finding about how Zacharia Levi Ltd was reached.

Incident analysis

Zacharia Levi Ltd was listed by Handala ransomware, a group with 175 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on June 21, 2025.

Zacharia Levi Ltd is based in Israel and operates in the Construction sector. Israel ranks #23 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 152 victims in this database.

Sector context. Construction firms often hold sensitive project data, client financials, and intellectual property. The industry's typically lean IT security teams can make them more vulnerable.

Handala typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Who lists Construction organisations

364 Construction organisations were named in the last 12 months, by group. Select a group for its list.

Frequently asked questions

Was Zacharia Levi Ltd attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Zacharia Levi Ltd was listed as a victim of the Handala ransomware group on June 21, 2025. The organisation is based in Israel and operates in the Construction sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Zacharia Levi Ltd?

Zacharia Levi Ltd was attacked by Handala ransomware. Handala is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 175 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Zacharia Levi Ltd ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Zacharia Levi Ltd was disclosed on June 21, 2025. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Zacharia Levi Ltd ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Zacharia Levi Ltd has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Construction organisation, Zacharia Levi Ltd likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Handala attacks?

To defend against Handala and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.