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Ransomware group

Bianlian ransomware

201 victims listed on the Bianlian leak site across 16 countries. Most recent disclosure .

Victims
201
0.8% of all tracked
Countries
16
Most: United States
Sectors
13
Most: Business Services
First seen
Jan 2024
In this database

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from the ransomware.live profile for Bianlian and from this database. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

Who Bianlian is

BianLian ransomware operations began in late 2021. The group practices multi-pronged extortion, demanding payment for a decryptor, as well as the non-release of stolen data. The ransomware group hosts a public, TOR-based, blog to post victim identities and stolen data. Somewhat unique to BianLian at the time of their launch was their inclusion of an I2P mirror for their blog.

Recorded activity

Disclosures attributed to Bianlian in this database run from January 2024 to March 2025, totalling 201 victims — 0.8% of everything tracked here. Bianlian has listed victims in 16 countries in this database, most often United States, followed by Canada and India. The sectors appearing most in its listings are Business Services, Healthcare, Financial Services.

How Bianlian is documented to operate

Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059 Execution

Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell. There are also cross-platform interpreters such as Python, as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as JavaScript and Visual Basic.

Mitigations: Restrict Web-Based Content, Limit Software Installation, Execution Prevention, Code Signing, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint, Privileged Account Management

MITRE ATT&CK reference
User Execution T1204 Execution

An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing. While User Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.

Mitigations: Network Intrusion Prevention, Restrict Web-Based Content, Limit Software Installation, User Training, Execution Prevention, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Software Packing T1027.002 Stealth

Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code. Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX.

Mitigations: Antivirus/Antimalware

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Masquerading T1036 Stealth

Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names. Renaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of Masquerading.

Mitigations: User Training, Execution Prevention, Code Signing, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint, User Account Management, Restrict File and Directory Permissions

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion T1497 Stealth Discovery

Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.

MITRE ATT&CK reference
System Information Discovery T1082 Discovery

An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes. Tools such as Systeminfo can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the <codesystemsetup</code configuration tool on macOS.

MITRE ATT&CK reference
File and Directory Discovery T1083 Discovery

Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include <codedir</code, <codetree</code, <codels</code, <codefind</code, and <codelocate</code. Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the Native API.

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Peripheral Device Discovery T1120 Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Security Software Discovery T1518.001 Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

MITRE ATT&CK reference
Replication Through Removable Media T1091 Lateral Movement Initial Access

Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.

Mitigations: Limit Hardware Installation, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint, Disable or Remove Feature or Program

MITRE ATT&CK reference

MITRE ATT&CK techniques attributed to Bianlian across its recorded activity. They describe the group overall, not any single incident.

Tooling observed in Bianlian operations

  • RDP Recognizer
  • Advanced IP Scanner
  • Advanced Port Scanner
  • PingCastle
  • SharpShares
  • SoftPerfect NetScan
  • WKTools
  • MEGA
  • RClone
  • PsExec
  • Impacket
  • AmmyyAdmin

Software reported in use by Bianlian. Most are legitimate administration or transfer utilities; their presence in an environment is a signal to investigate, not proof of compromise.

Indicators of compromise

  • 36171704cde087f839b10c2465d864e1
  • d10e0387e3d55dc1f82c23719e2b168b
  • 0c756fc8f34e409650cd910b5e2a3f00
  • b3cdf0489ff37fe65141be9363b9489c
  • 08e76dd242e64bb31aec09db8464b28f
  • 14da9c0c4e3ac3b9abb2c48b37bece19
  • 104.238.35.179:38901
  • 151.236.16.242:12818
  • 85.235.151.5:8080
  • 5.255.106.12:80
  • 23.227.198.237:13937
  • 5.255.106.12:3389
  • [email protected]

Showing a sample of 8 MD5, 60 IP, 1 EMAIL on file. Hashes and network indicators published for Bianlian. Leak-site addresses are deliberately excluded. Indicators age quickly — treat a match as a starting point for investigation, and an absence of matches as no assurance.

YARA detection rules

bianlian.yar
rule BianLian_Go_Ransomware {
	meta:
		description = "Detects BianLian ransomware"
		author = "BlackBerry Threat Research Team"
		date = "2022-09-13"
		license = "This Yara rule is provided under the Apache License 2.0 (https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0) and open to any user or organization, as long as you use it under this license and ensure originator credit in any derivative to the BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team"
	strings:
		$s1 = "trimpath=/home/jack/Projects/project1/"
		$s2 = "common.BuildPath"
		$s3 = "common.GetBlocksAmount"
		$s4 = "common.GetDrives"
		$s5 = "common.GetBlockSize"
		$s6 = "common.FileRename"
		$s7 = "common.GetFileExtension"
		$s8 = "exec.(*Cmd).Start.func1"
		$s9 = "exec.(*Cmd).Start.func2"
		$s10 = "exec.(*Cmd).Start.func3"
		$s11 = "CryptBlocks"
	condition:
		uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and all of them
}

Community-contributed rules for Bianlian, reproduced as published. Test them against your own corpus before relying on them: rule quality and false-positive behaviour vary by author.

Threat actor analysis

Bianlian has disclosed 201 victims on its leak site, 0.8% of all ransomware listings tracked in this database. Its earliest disclosure here dates to January 2024.

The group has listed organisations in 16 countries, most often in United States (163 victims), followed by Canada, India, United Kingdom.

By industry, its listings concentrate in Business Services, Healthcare, Financial Services — sectors that hold sensitive data or cannot tolerate long outages, both of which raise the pressure to pay.

Like most current ransomware operations, Bianlian is likely to use double extortion: data is stolen before files are encrypted, and organisations that refuse to pay are named on the leak site with the stolen data as leverage.

Bianlian victims 201

Page 1 of 3
Organization Disclosed
CMC Technology Group
VNVietnam
Meridian Senior
USUnited States
Saunders and Saunders
GBUnited Kingdom
Sonrisas Dental Health
USUnited States
Goshen Medical Center
USUnited States
Allworx
USUnited States
Island Realty
USUnited States
Minnesota Orthodontics
USUnited States
Ewald Consulting
USUnited States
Keystone Pacific Property Management LLC
USUnited States
Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake
USUnited States
Mosley Glick O’Brien, Inc.
USUnited States
Alabama Ophthalmology Associates
USUnited States
Aspire Rural Health System
USUnited States
Dain, Torpy, Le Ray, Wiest & Garner, P.C.
USUnited States
Financial Services of America, Inc.
USUnited States
Layfield & Borel CPA's L.L.C
USUnited States
Nash Brothers Construction
USUnited States
Nippon Steel USA
USUnited States
D-7 Roofing
USUnited States
Recievership Specialists
USUnited States
Dash Business
Hall Chadwick
AUAustralia
NESCTC Security Services
USUnited States
C & R Molds Inc
USUnited States
Commercial Solutions
USUnited States
Ayres Law Firm
USUnited States
Civic Committee
USUnited States
Cyrious Software
USUnited States
Growth Acceleration Partners
USUnited States
Medical Associates of Brevard
USUnited States
MassDevelopment
USUnited States
Caframo Limited.
CACanada
Cottrell Fletcher & Cottrell P.C.
USUnited States
Giordano, DelCollo, Werb & Gagne, LLC.
USUnited States
American Computer Estimating Inc
USUnited States
MedRevenu Inc
USUnited States
Mid Florida Primary Care
USUnited States
Global Insurance Agency LLC
USUnited States
Physicians' Primary Care of Southwest Florida
USUnited States
LTI Trucking Services
USUnited States
Star Shuttle Inc.
USUnited States
Alpine Ear Nose & Throat
USUnited States
TWRU CPAs & Financial Advisors
USUnited States
Trinity Petroleum Management, LLC
USUnited States
Kellerhals Ferguson Kroblin PLLC
USUnited States
Silverback Exploration
USUnited States
Amherstburg Family Health
CACanada
Immuno Laboratories, Inc
USUnited States
ATSG, Inc
USUnited States
Mizuno (USA)
USUnited States
Palmisano & Goodman, P.A.
USUnited States
Healthcare Management Systems
USUnited States
Falco Sult
ITItaly
L & B Transport, L.L.C.
USUnited States
Russell Law Firm, LLC
USUnited States
CLAS Information Services
USUnited States
Premier Work Support
GBUnited Kingdom
McElroy, Quirk & Burch, APC
USUnited States
Gluckstein Personal Injury Lawyers
CACanada
The Povman Law Firm
USUnited States
Corporate Job Bank
USUnited States
Lein Law Offices
USUnited States
Boston Children's Health Physicians
USUnited States
Pearl Cohen
USUnited States
First Choice Sales & Marketing Group (First Choice)
USUnited States
River Region Cardiology Associates
USUnited States
Hunter Dickinson Inc.
CACanada
Sherr Puttmann Akins Lamb PC
USUnited States
Law Offices of Michael J Gurfinkel, Inc
USUnited States
Ladov Law Firm
ILIsrael
HDI
DEGermany
Anniversary Holding
CHSwitzerland
Battle Lumber Co.
USUnited States
Smart Source, Inc.
USUnited States
CK Associates
USUnited States
Keya Accounting and Tax Services LLC
USUnited States
Western Supplies, Inc
USUnited States
Eric Rossi CPA LLC
USUnited States
ICWI
JMJamaica
Lane Supply Inc.
USUnited States
Stein Fibers
USUnited States
Wayne Wright, LLP.
USUnited States
Atwood & Cherny, P.C.
USUnited States
Fish Nelson & Holden
USUnited States
M.Royo & KlockMetal
ARArgentina
Scott Pharma Solutions
USUnited States
Sable International
ZASouth Africa
Studio Legale Associato Isolabella
ITItaly
Mohawk Valley Cardiology PC
USUnited States
PBC Companies
USUnited States
Benson Kearley IFG - Insurance Brokers & Financial Advisors
CACanada
Texas Centers for Infectious Disease Associates
USUnited States
Thompson Davis & Co
USUnited States
Southwest Family Medicine Associates
USUnited States
Anniversary Holding Company
USUnited States
GCA Global Cargo Alliance
USUnited States
Majestic Metals
USUnited States
Florence Cement Company, Inc.
USUnited States
Sable International.
GBUnited Kingdom

Frequently asked questions

What is Bianlian ransomware?

Bianlian is a ransomware threat group that has claimed 201 victims since its first known activity in January 2024. The group operates by infiltrating target networks, exfiltrating data, encrypting files, and threatening to publish stolen data on a dark web leak site if the ransom is not paid.

How many victims has Bianlian attacked?

Bianlian has claimed 201 victims in our database, representing 0.8% of all tracked ransomware attacks. The most targeted countries are United States, Canada, India, United Kingdom.

Which countries does Bianlian target?

Bianlian has attacked organizations in 16 countries. The top targeted countries are: United States, Canada, India, United Kingdom.

Which industries does Bianlian target?

Bianlian most frequently targets the Business Services, Healthcare, Financial Services sectors based on victim disclosures in our database.

Is Bianlian still active?

Bianlian's most recent victim disclosure in our database was on March 31, 2025. Ransomware groups frequently rebrand or go dormant; monitor this page and our ransomware map for the latest activity.