201 victims listed on the Bianlian leak site across 16 countries.
Most recent disclosure .
Victims
201
0.8% of all tracked
Countries
16
Most: United States
Sectors
13
Most: Business Services
First seen
Jan 2024
In this database
ThreatAI analysis
Compiled from the ransomware.live profile for Bianlian and from this database. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.
Who Bianlian is
BianLian ransomware operations began in late 2021. The group practices multi-pronged extortion, demanding payment for a decryptor, as well as the non-release of stolen data. The ransomware group hosts a public, TOR-based, blog to post victim identities and stolen data. Somewhat unique to BianLian at the time of their launch was their inclusion of an I2P mirror for their blog.
Recorded activity
Disclosures attributed to Bianlian in this database run from January 2024 to March 2025, totalling 201 victims — 0.8% of everything tracked here. Bianlian has listed victims in 16 countries in this database, most often United States, followed by Canada and India. The sectors appearing most in its listings are Business Services, Healthcare, Financial Services.
How Bianlian is documented to operate
Command and Scripting InterpreterT1059Execution
Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell. There are also cross-platform interpreters such as Python, as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as JavaScript and Visual Basic.
An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing. While User Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.
Mitigations:
Network Intrusion Prevention, Restrict Web-Based Content, Limit Software Installation, User Training, Execution Prevention, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code. Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX.
Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names. Renaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of Masquerading.
Mitigations:
User Training, Execution Prevention, Code Signing, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint, User Account Management, Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes. Tools such as Systeminfo can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the <codesystemsetup</code configuration tool on macOS.
Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include <codedir</code, <codetree</code, <codels</code, <codefind</code, and <codelocate</code. Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the Native API.
Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Replication Through Removable MediaT1091Lateral MovementInitial Access
Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.
Mitigations:
Limit Hardware Installation, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint, Disable or Remove Feature or Program
MITRE ATT&CK techniques attributed to Bianlian across its recorded activity. They describe the group overall, not any single incident.
Tooling observed in Bianlian operations
RDP Recognizer
Advanced IP Scanner
Advanced Port Scanner
PingCastle
SharpShares
SoftPerfect NetScan
WKTools
MEGA
RClone
PsExec
Impacket
AmmyyAdmin
Software reported in use by Bianlian. Most are legitimate administration or transfer utilities; their presence in an environment is a signal to investigate, not proof of compromise.
Showing a sample of 8 MD5, 60 IP, 1 EMAIL on file. Hashes and network indicators published for Bianlian. Leak-site addresses are deliberately excluded. Indicators age quickly — treat a match as a starting point for investigation, and an absence of matches as no assurance.
YARA detection rules
bianlian.yar
rule BianLian_Go_Ransomware {
meta:
description = "Detects BianLian ransomware"
author = "BlackBerry Threat Research Team"
date = "2022-09-13"
license = "This Yara rule is provided under the Apache License 2.0 (https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0) and open to any user or organization, as long as you use it under this license and ensure originator credit in any derivative to the BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team"
strings:
$s1 = "trimpath=/home/jack/Projects/project1/"
$s2 = "common.BuildPath"
$s3 = "common.GetBlocksAmount"
$s4 = "common.GetDrives"
$s5 = "common.GetBlockSize"
$s6 = "common.FileRename"
$s7 = "common.GetFileExtension"
$s8 = "exec.(*Cmd).Start.func1"
$s9 = "exec.(*Cmd).Start.func2"
$s10 = "exec.(*Cmd).Start.func3"
$s11 = "CryptBlocks"
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and all of them
}
Community-contributed rules for Bianlian, reproduced as published. Test them against your own corpus before relying on them: rule quality and false-positive behaviour vary by author.
Threat actor analysis
Bianlian has disclosed 201 victims
on its leak site, 0.8% of all ransomware listings tracked in this database.
Its earliest disclosure here dates to January 2024.
The group has listed organisations in 16 countries,
most often in United States
(163 victims),
followed by Canada, India, United Kingdom.
By industry, its listings concentrate in Business Services, Healthcare, Financial Services —
sectors that hold sensitive data or cannot tolerate long outages, both of which raise the pressure to pay.
Like most current ransomware operations, Bianlian is likely to use double extortion:
data is stolen before files are encrypted, and organisations that refuse to pay are named on the leak site
with the stolen data as leverage.
Bianlian is a ransomware threat group that has claimed 201 victims since its first known activity in January 2024. The group operates by infiltrating target networks, exfiltrating data, encrypting files, and threatening to publish stolen data on a dark web leak site if the ransom is not paid.
How many victims has Bianlian attacked?
Bianlian has claimed 201 victims in our database, representing 0.8% of all tracked ransomware attacks. The most targeted countries are United States, Canada, India, United Kingdom.
Which countries does Bianlian target?
Bianlian has attacked organizations in 16 countries. The top targeted countries are: United States, Canada, India, United Kingdom.
Which industries does Bianlian target?
Bianlian most frequently targets the Business Services, Healthcare, Financial Services sectors based on victim disclosures in our database.
Is Bianlian still active?
Bianlian's most recent victim disclosure in our database was on March 31, 2025. Ransomware groups frequently rebrand or go dormant; monitor this page and our ransomware map for the latest activity.
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