AY
Ransomware Victim Government & Defense

Ayuntamiento de Velilla de San Antonio

Ransomware attack by Kairos Β· Disclosed August 20, 2026 Β· πŸ‡ͺπŸ‡Έ Spain

ayto-velilla.es

Date Disclosed
Aug 20, 2026
2026
Threat Group
Kairos
96 total victims
Industry
Government & Defense

ThreatAI Analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Kairos. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

Kairos listed Ayuntamiento de Velilla de San Antonio on its dark web leak site on 20 August 2026, which is based in Spain and operates in the Government & Defense sector.

About the Kairos group

Kairos is a data extortion group active since late 2024 that focuses solely on data theft with no encryption, primarily targeting small-to-mid-sized organizations in healthcare, manufacturing, and business services in the US, purchasing initial access from brokers and demanding Bitcoin payments. Kairos has listed 92 victims since June 2024.

Incident Analysis

Ayuntamiento de Velilla de San Antonio was targeted by Kairos ransomware, one of the most active ransomware groups in our database with 96 confirmed victims globally. The attack was disclosed on August 20, 2026, when Ayuntamiento de Velilla de San Antonio appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Ayuntamiento de Velilla de San Antonio is based in Spain , operating in the Government & Defense sector. Spain ranks #9 globally for ransomware attacks, with 425 victims in our database.

Sector context: Organisations in this sector hold valuable data and operational systems that ransomware groups seek to exploit for financial gain through encryption and data exfiltration.

Kairos typically employs a double extortion model: first exfiltrating sensitive data from the victim's systems, then deploying ransomware to encrypt files. Victims face two simultaneous threats β€” paying to restore access and paying to prevent publication of stolen data. The group's leak site publishes victim names and exfiltrated data as leverage.

Data source: This incident record is sourced from public ransomware group leak site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. Disclosure date reflects when the victim was published on the leak site, which may differ from the initial date of compromise. This platform does not publish or link to stolen data. Last data update: Sep 7, 2026 00:00 UTC.

Frequently Asked Questions

Was Ayuntamiento de Velilla de San Antonio attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Ayuntamiento de Velilla de San Antonio was listed as a victim of the Kairos ransomware group on August 20, 2026. The organisation is based in Spain and operates in the Government & Defense sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Ayuntamiento de Velilla de San Antonio?

Ayuntamiento de Velilla de San Antonio was attacked by Kairos ransomware. Kairos is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 96 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Ayuntamiento de Velilla de San Antonio ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Ayuntamiento de Velilla de San Antonio was disclosed on August 20, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Ayuntamiento de Velilla de San Antonio ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Ayuntamiento de Velilla de San Antonio has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Government & Defense organisation, Ayuntamiento de Velilla de San Antonio likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Kairos attacks?

To defend against Kairos and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.