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Cyber Threat
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Ransomware victim Transportation

Excess Baggage

Listed by Ransomhouse on · organisation based in United Kingdom

www.excess-baggage.com

Disclosed
Oct 13, 2026
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Ransomhouse
158 victims listed
Country
United Kingdom
#4 most targeted
Sector
Transportation

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Ransomhouse. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About Excess Baggage

Baggage Express is a dynamic national and international excess baggage shipping company with a heritage stretching back some 25 years. We're dedicated to the task of moving the holdalls, cartons, computers, bikes, luggage and material lives of students, backpackers, expats and anyone else who has found themselves in the UK needing their belongings sent elsewhere. Flexibility is the key to the company's success, tailoring the company's baggage shipping services to the specific individual needs of the company's customers.

Source record: ransomware.live

About the Ransomhouse group

RansomHouse is a double-extortion RaaS operation active since late 2021, attributed to the threat actor "Jolly Scorpius," targeting over 120 organizations across healthcare, finance, transportation, and government, recently upgrading to a multi-layered dual-key encryption architecture. Ransomhouse has listed 212 victims since June 2021.

Incident analysis

Excess Baggage was listed by Ransomhouse ransomware, a group with 158 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on October 13, 2026.

Excess Baggage is based in United Kingdom and operates in the Transportation sector. United Kingdom ranks #4 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 957 victims in this database.

Sector context. Organisations in this sector hold valuable data and operational systems that ransomware groups seek to exploit for financial gain through encryption and data exfiltration.

Ransomhouse typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was Excess Baggage attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Excess Baggage was listed as a victim of the Ransomhouse ransomware group on October 13, 2026. The organisation is based in United Kingdom and operates in the Transportation sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Excess Baggage?

Excess Baggage was attacked by Ransomhouse ransomware. Ransomhouse is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 158 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Excess Baggage ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Excess Baggage was disclosed on October 13, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Excess Baggage ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Excess Baggage has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Transportation organisation, Excess Baggage likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Ransomhouse attacks?

To defend against Ransomhouse and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.