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Ransomware Victim Energy

fhw-neukoelln.de

Ransomware attack by Dragonforce · Disclosed April 2, 2026 · 🇩🇪 Germany

fhw-neukoelln.de

Date Disclosed
Apr 2, 2026
2026
Threat Group
Dragonforce
629 total victims
Country
🇩🇪 Germany
Industry
Energy

ThreatAI Analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Dragonforce. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About the Dragonforce group

DragonForce is a major ransomware-as-a-service operation first observed in August 2023 that launched a formal affiliate program offering 80% revenue share, then rebranded as a "ransomware cartel" in 2025, gaining notoriety for high-profile attacks on UK retailers Marks & Spencer, Co-op, and Harrods. Dragonforce has listed 636 victims since October 2022.

How Dragonforce is documented to operate

User Execution T1204 Execution

An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing. While User Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.

Mitigations: Network Intrusion Prevention, Restrict Web-Based Content, Limit Software Installation, User Training, Execution Prevention, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK reference →
File and Directory Discovery T1083 Discovery

Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include <codedir</code, <codetree</code, <codels</code, <codefind</code, and <codelocate</code. Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the Native API.

MITRE ATT&CK reference →
Data Encrypted for Impact T1486 Impact

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Mitigations: Data Backup, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK reference →

MITRE ATT&CK techniques attributed to Dragonforce across its recorded activity, not a finding about how fhw-neukoelln.de was reached.

Incident Analysis

fhw-neukoelln.de was targeted by Dragonforce ransomware, one of the most active ransomware groups in our database with 629 confirmed victims globally. The attack was disclosed on April 2, 2026, when fhw-neukoelln.de appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

fhw-neukoelln.de is based in Germany , operating in the Energy sector. Germany ranks #2 globally for ransomware attacks, with 915 victims in our database.

Sector context: Energy sector attacks can have critical infrastructure implications. Ransomware on operational technology (OT) networks can disrupt power generation and distribution, elevating the urgency of recovery.

Dragonforce typically employs a double extortion model: first exfiltrating sensitive data from the victim's systems, then deploying ransomware to encrypt files. Victims face two simultaneous threats — paying to restore access and paying to prevent publication of stolen data. The group's leak site publishes victim names and exfiltrated data as leverage.

Data source: This incident record is sourced from public ransomware group leak site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. Disclosure date reflects when the victim was published on the leak site, which may differ from the initial date of compromise. This platform does not publish or link to stolen data. Last data update: Sep 7, 2026 22:00 UTC.

Frequently Asked Questions

Was fhw-neukoelln.de attacked by ransomware?

Yes. fhw-neukoelln.de was listed as a victim of the Dragonforce ransomware group on April 2, 2026. The organisation is based in Germany and operates in the Energy sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked fhw-neukoelln.de?

fhw-neukoelln.de was attacked by Dragonforce ransomware. Dragonforce is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 629 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the fhw-neukoelln.de ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on fhw-neukoelln.de was disclosed on April 2, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the fhw-neukoelln.de ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from fhw-neukoelln.de has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Energy organisation, fhw-neukoelln.de likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Dragonforce attacks?

To defend against Dragonforce and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.