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Ransomware victim Healthcare

Hospital Clnico Universidad de Chile

Listed by Direwolf on · organisation based in Chile

redclinica.cl

Disclosed
Aug 30, 2026
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Direwolf
151 victims listed
Country
Chile
#36 most targeted
Sector
Healthcare

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Direwolf. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

Direwolf listed Hospital Clnico Universidad de Chile on its dark web leak site on 30 August 2026. Based in Chile, the hospital operates in the Healthcare sector.

About the Direwolf group

Dire Wolf is a sophisticated human-operated ransomware group first documented in May 2025, written in Golang using Curve25519/ChaCha20 encryption, targeting manufacturing and technology sectors across 13+ countries with ransoms up to $500,000, operated by a tight core team rather than a broad affiliate program. Direwolf has listed 136 victims since April 2025.

Vulnerabilities Direwolf is recorded exploiting

5 of these 5 are in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, 5 of them recorded by CISA as used in ransomware campaigns. CVEs attributed to Direwolf across its reported activity. There is no indication that any of these was involved in the Hospital Clnico Universidad de Chile incident — the source data does not record an entry point.

Incident analysis

Hospital Clnico Universidad de Chile was listed by Direwolf ransomware, a group with 151 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on August 30, 2026.

Hospital Clnico Universidad de Chile is based in Chile and operates in the Healthcare sector. Chile ranks #36 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 82 victims in this database.

Sector context. Healthcare organisations are high-value ransomware targets because patient data is extremely sensitive, regulatory penalties for breaches are severe, and operational downtime can threaten patient safety — all factors that increase ransom payment pressure.

Direwolf typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Frequently asked questions

Was Hospital Clnico Universidad de Chile attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Hospital Clnico Universidad de Chile was listed as a victim of the Direwolf ransomware group on August 30, 2026. The organisation is based in Chile and operates in the Healthcare sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Hospital Clnico Universidad de Chile?

Hospital Clnico Universidad de Chile was attacked by Direwolf ransomware. Direwolf is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 151 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Hospital Clnico Universidad de Chile ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Hospital Clnico Universidad de Chile was disclosed on August 30, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Hospital Clnico Universidad de Chile ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Hospital Clnico Universidad de Chile has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Healthcare organisation, Hospital Clnico Universidad de Chile likely held patient records, medical data, and personally identifiable information (PII).

How can organisations protect against Direwolf attacks?

To defend against Direwolf and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.