IN
Ransomware Victim Healthcare

Interim HealthCare [Head office]

Ransomware attack by Anubis Β· Disclosed August 21, 2026 Β· πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡Έ United States

interimhealthcare.com

Date Disclosed
Aug 21, 2026
2026
Threat Group
Anubis
111 total victims
Industry
Healthcare

ThreatAI Analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Anubis. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

Anubis listed Interim HealthCare [Head office] on its dark web leak site on 21 August 2026. The healthcare organisation is based in United States and operates in the Healthcare sector.

About the Anubis group

Anubis is a ransomware-as-a-service group active since December 2024 that targets healthcare, engineering, construction, and professional services sectors, offering affiliates a flexible revenue split model and an optional destructive "wipe mode" alongside standard encryption. Anubis has listed 107 victims since February 2025.

Incident Analysis

Interim HealthCare [Head office] was targeted by Anubis ransomware, one of the most active ransomware groups in our database with 111 confirmed victims globally. The attack was disclosed on August 21, 2026, when Interim HealthCare [Head office] appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Interim HealthCare [Head office] is based in United States , operating in the Healthcare sector. United States ranks #1 globally for ransomware attacks, with 9,477 victims in our database.

Sector context: Healthcare organisations are high-value ransomware targets because patient data is extremely sensitive, regulatory penalties for breaches are severe, and operational downtime can threaten patient safety β€” all factors that increase ransom payment pressure.

Anubis typically employs a double extortion model: first exfiltrating sensitive data from the victim's systems, then deploying ransomware to encrypt files. Victims face two simultaneous threats β€” paying to restore access and paying to prevent publication of stolen data. The group's leak site publishes victim names and exfiltrated data as leverage.

Data source: This incident record is sourced from public ransomware group leak site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. Disclosure date reflects when the victim was published on the leak site, which may differ from the initial date of compromise. This platform does not publish or link to stolen data. Last data update: Sep 14, 2026 08:00 UTC.

Frequently Asked Questions

Was Interim HealthCare [Head office] attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Interim HealthCare [Head office] was listed as a victim of the Anubis ransomware group on August 21, 2026. The organisation is based in United States and operates in the Healthcare sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Interim HealthCare [Head office]?

Interim HealthCare [Head office] was attacked by Anubis ransomware. Anubis is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 111 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Interim HealthCare [Head office] ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Interim HealthCare [Head office] was disclosed on August 21, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Interim HealthCare [Head office] ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Interim HealthCare [Head office] has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Healthcare organisation, Interim HealthCare [Head office] likely held patient records, medical data, and personally identifiable information (PII).

How can organisations protect against Anubis attacks?

To defend against Anubis and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.