Cyber Threat Intelligence
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Ransomware Victim Healthcare

National Kidney Registry

Ransomware attack by Direwolf · Disclosed August 25, 2026 · 🇺🇸 United States

kidneyregistry.com

Date Disclosed
Aug 25, 2026
2026
Threat Group
Direwolf
124 total victims
Country
🇺🇸 United States
Industry
Healthcare

ThreatAI Analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Direwolf. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

Direwolf listed National Kidney Registry on its dark web leak site on 25 August 2026; the United States-based healthcare sector organization operates there.

About the Direwolf group

Dire Wolf is a sophisticated human-operated ransomware group first documented in May 2025, written in Golang using Curve25519/ChaCha20 encryption, targeting manufacturing and technology sectors across 13+ countries with ransoms up to $500,000, operated by a tight core team rather than a broad affiliate program. Direwolf has listed 75 victims since April 2025.

Incident Analysis

National Kidney Registry was targeted by Direwolf ransomware, one of the most active ransomware groups in our database with 124 confirmed victims globally. The attack was disclosed on August 25, 2026, when National Kidney Registry appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

National Kidney Registry is based in United States , operating in the Healthcare sector. United States ranks #1 globally for ransomware attacks, with 9,412 victims in our database.

Sector context: Healthcare organisations are high-value ransomware targets because patient data is extremely sensitive, regulatory penalties for breaches are severe, and operational downtime can threaten patient safety — all factors that increase ransom payment pressure.

Direwolf typically employs a double extortion model: first exfiltrating sensitive data from the victim's systems, then deploying ransomware to encrypt files. Victims face two simultaneous threats — paying to restore access and paying to prevent publication of stolen data. The group's leak site publishes victim names and exfiltrated data as leverage.

Data source: This incident record is sourced from public ransomware group leak site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. Disclosure date reflects when the victim was published on the leak site, which may differ from the initial date of compromise. This platform does not publish or link to stolen data. Last data update: Sep 5, 2026 14:00 UTC.

Frequently Asked Questions

Was National Kidney Registry attacked by ransomware?

Yes. National Kidney Registry was listed as a victim of the Direwolf ransomware group on August 25, 2026. The organisation is based in United States and operates in the Healthcare sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked National Kidney Registry?

National Kidney Registry was attacked by Direwolf ransomware. Direwolf is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 124 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the National Kidney Registry ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on National Kidney Registry was disclosed on August 25, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the National Kidney Registry ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from National Kidney Registry has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Healthcare organisation, National Kidney Registry likely held patient records, medical data, and personally identifiable information (PII).

How can organisations protect against Direwolf attacks?

To defend against Direwolf and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.