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Cyber Threat
CTI Academy Sponsor CTI Academy
Ransomware victim Financial Services

nipponindiaim

Listed by Warlock on · organisation based in India

nipponindiamf.com

Disclosed
Jun 11, 2025
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Warlock
78 victims listed
Country
India
#8 most targeted
Sector
Financial Services

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Warlock. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

About the Warlock group

The Warlock ransomware and operator(s) are believed to be attributed to Storm-2603, a China-based threat actor who is also known to have deployed LockBit ransomware. There's also a crossover between victims with Black Basta. Both are RaaS and have a long list of known and unknown affiliates. Having said that, this is possibly an affiliate (likely a cybergroup) of both of those groups. The Alliance & Association would technically be Encryptor Sharing, but this is realistically more of an "Old Affiliate" that created their own ransomware encryptor and operation. Warlock has listed 78 victims since April 2025.

Vulnerabilities Warlock is recorded exploiting

6 of these 6 are in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, 4 of them recorded by CISA as used in ransomware campaigns. CVEs attributed to Warlock across its reported activity. There is no indication that any of these was involved in the nipponindiaim incident — the source data does not record an entry point.

Incident analysis

nipponindiaim was listed by Warlock ransomware, a group with 78 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on June 11, 2025.

nipponindiaim is based in India and operates in the Financial Services sector. India ranks #8 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 497 victims in this database.

Sector context. Financial sector organisations are targeted for their access to funds, sensitive financial data, and the reputational damage a public breach can cause. Regulatory requirements also increase recovery costs.

Warlock typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was nipponindiaim attacked by ransomware?

Yes. nipponindiaim was listed as a victim of the Warlock ransomware group on June 11, 2025. The organisation is based in India and operates in the Financial Services sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked nipponindiaim?

nipponindiaim was attacked by Warlock ransomware. Warlock is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 78 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the nipponindiaim ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on nipponindiaim was disclosed on June 11, 2025. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the nipponindiaim ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from nipponindiaim has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Financial Services organisation, nipponindiaim likely held financial records, client data, and transaction histories.

How can organisations protect against Warlock attacks?

To defend against Warlock and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.