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Ransomware Victim Healthcare

Owen Leigh Optometry

Ransomware attack by Dragonforce · Disclosed September 16, 2026 · 🇬🇧 United Kingdom

owenleighoptometry.co.uk

Date Disclosed
Sep 16, 2026
2026
Threat Group
Dragonforce
632 total victims
Country
🇬🇧 United Kingdom
Industry
Healthcare

ThreatAI Analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Dragonforce. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

Dragonforce dark web leak site listed Owen Leigh Optometry on 16 September 2026. The practice specializes in helping patients improve their vision through visual efficiency glasses, exercises, and lenses.

About Owen Leigh Optometry

Full DATA 400 GB+ The brain uses the eyes to gather information about our surroundings. The brain cannot process all our view so it must first decide what to look for. The eyes-brain system then has to select that information, usually by shifting eye position and often by shifting focus. How the eyes-brain go through this process is the real test of visual efficiency. Here at Owen Leigh Optometry, we specialise in helping patients of all ages to develop flexibility in their vision to meet all their needs and interests. We start this by observing and measuring your eye-brain system with a wide range of visual challenges. Eye health and eyesight are important, but this must not be the end point of developing good vision. We want to take you much further than that, to explore ways that you can see more, feel more, move better, plan better and understand quicker. ​ We use 'visual efficiency glasses', vision exercises (vision therapy) and 'training/learning lenses' to help you develop your own vision. We add visual hygiene, consider coloured lenses and refer to other disciplines if that will help you meet your goals. “What we see is dependant upon what we are looking for and what we managed to see last time.”

Source record: ransomware.live

About the Dragonforce group

DragonForce is a major ransomware-as-a-service operation first observed in August 2023 that launched a formal affiliate program offering 80% revenue share, then rebranded as a "ransomware cartel" in 2025, gaining notoriety for high-profile attacks on UK retailers Marks & Spencer, Co-op, and Harrods. Dragonforce has listed 648 victims since October 2022.

How Dragonforce is documented to operate

User Execution T1204 Execution

An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing. While User Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.

Mitigations: Network Intrusion Prevention, Restrict Web-Based Content, Limit Software Installation, User Training, Execution Prevention, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK reference →
File and Directory Discovery T1083 Discovery

Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include <codedir</code, <codetree</code, <codels</code, <codefind</code, and <codelocate</code. Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the Native API.

MITRE ATT&CK reference →
Data Encrypted for Impact T1486 Impact

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Mitigations: Data Backup, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK reference →

MITRE ATT&CK techniques attributed to Dragonforce across its recorded activity, not a finding about how Owen Leigh Optometry was reached.

Vulnerabilities Dragonforce is recorded exploiting

6 of these 6 are in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, 6 of them recorded by CISA as used in ransomware campaigns. CVEs attributed to Dragonforce across its reported activity. There is no indication that any of these was involved in the Owen Leigh Optometry incident — the source data does not record an entry point.

Incident Analysis

Owen Leigh Optometry was targeted by Dragonforce ransomware, one of the most active ransomware groups in our database with 632 confirmed victims globally. The attack was disclosed on September 16, 2026, when Owen Leigh Optometry appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Owen Leigh Optometry is based in United Kingdom , operating in the Healthcare sector. United Kingdom ranks #4 globally for ransomware attacks, with 903 victims in our database.

Sector context: Healthcare organisations are high-value ransomware targets because patient data is extremely sensitive, regulatory penalties for breaches are severe, and operational downtime can threaten patient safety — all factors that increase ransom payment pressure.

Dragonforce typically employs a double extortion model: first exfiltrating sensitive data from the victim's systems, then deploying ransomware to encrypt files. Victims face two simultaneous threats — paying to restore access and paying to prevent publication of stolen data. The group's leak site publishes victim names and exfiltrated data as leverage.

Data source: This incident record is sourced from public ransomware group leak site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. Disclosure date reflects when the victim was published on the leak site, which may differ from the initial date of compromise. This platform does not publish or link to stolen data. Last data update: Sep 17, 2026 20:00 UTC.

Frequently Asked Questions

Was Owen Leigh Optometry attacked by ransomware?

Yes. Owen Leigh Optometry was listed as a victim of the Dragonforce ransomware group on September 16, 2026. The organisation is based in United Kingdom and operates in the Healthcare sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked Owen Leigh Optometry?

Owen Leigh Optometry was attacked by Dragonforce ransomware. Dragonforce is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 632 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the Owen Leigh Optometry ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on Owen Leigh Optometry was disclosed on September 16, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the Owen Leigh Optometry ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from Owen Leigh Optometry has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Healthcare organisation, Owen Leigh Optometry likely held patient records, medical data, and personally identifiable information (PII).

How can organisations protect against Dragonforce attacks?

To defend against Dragonforce and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.