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Cyber Threat
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Ransomware victim Transportation

TRANS LOGROÑO SOCIEDAD ANONIMA

Listed by Lamashtu on · organisation based in Spain

translo.es

Disclosed
Oct 5, 2026
Leak-site listing date
Threat group
Lamashtu
57 victims listed
Country
Spain
#9 most targeted
Sector
Transportation

ThreatAI analysis

Compiled from this incident record and the threat intelligence profile for Lamashtu. Figures and technique mappings are quoted from the source data, not inferred.

Lamashtu listed TRANS LOGROÑO SOCIEDAD ANONIMA on its dark web leak site on 5 October 2026. The Spanish road freight and logistics company provides haulage, freight forwarding, and warehouse services.

About TRANS LOGROÑO SOCIEDAD ANONIMA

TRANS-LOGROÑO, S.A. is a Spanish road freight and logistics company based in Logroño (La Rioja). It provides road haulage (CNAE 4941), freight forwarding, and warehouse services including storage, order picking, and tank cleaning.

Source record: ransomware.live

About the Lamashtu group

Lamashtu is an extortion group that first appeared in April 2026, claiming attacks against organizations in France, Romania, and Thailand across energy, pharmaceutical, and film sectors; it has not yet been confirmed as operating actual file-encrypting ransomware rather than pure data-theft extortion. Lamashtu has listed 48 victims since April 2026.

Incident analysis

TRANS LOGROÑO SOCIEDAD ANONIMA was listed by Lamashtu ransomware, a group with 57 victims recorded in this database. The listing appeared on the group's leak site on October 5, 2026.

TRANS LOGROÑO SOCIEDAD ANONIMA is based in Spain and operates in the Transportation sector. Spain ranks #9 worldwide for ransomware disclosures, with 462 victims in this database.

Sector context. Organisations in this sector hold valuable data and operational systems that ransomware groups seek to exploit for financial gain through encryption and data exfiltration.

Lamashtu typically follows a double extortion model: data is exfiltrated from the victim's systems before files are encrypted, so the victim faces two demands at once — pay to restore access, and pay to keep stolen data unpublished. The leak site, where this listing appeared, is the lever for the second demand.

Source. Public leak-site disclosures aggregated via the ransomware.live API. The disclosure date is when the listing was published, which can differ from the date of compromise. This site does not publish or link to stolen data. Last updated .

Frequently asked questions

Was TRANS LOGROÑO SOCIEDAD ANONIMA attacked by ransomware?

Yes. TRANS LOGROÑO SOCIEDAD ANONIMA was listed as a victim of the Lamashtu ransomware group on October 5, 2026. The organisation is based in Spain and operates in the Transportation sector. The disclosure appeared on the group's dark web leak site.

Which ransomware group attacked TRANS LOGROÑO SOCIEDAD ANONIMA?

TRANS LOGROÑO SOCIEDAD ANONIMA was attacked by Lamashtu ransomware. Lamashtu is one of the most active ransomware groups, having claimed 57 victims globally. The group typically employs a double-extortion model: encrypting the victim's files and threatening to publish stolen data.

When did the TRANS LOGROÑO SOCIEDAD ANONIMA ransomware attack occur?

The ransomware attack on TRANS LOGROÑO SOCIEDAD ANONIMA was disclosed on October 5, 2026. This date reflects when the victim was published on the threat group's leak site, which may differ from the actual date of initial compromise.

What data was stolen in the TRANS LOGROÑO SOCIEDAD ANONIMA ransomware attack?

The specific data stolen from TRANS LOGROÑO SOCIEDAD ANONIMA has not been independently verified by this platform. Ransomware groups typically exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and use the threat of publication to pressure victims. As a Transportation organisation, TRANS LOGROÑO SOCIEDAD ANONIMA likely held sensitive business data, client information, and operational records.

How can organisations protect against Lamashtu attacks?

To defend against Lamashtu and similar threat actors, organisations should: maintain regular offline backups tested for restoration; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; deploy multi-factor authentication on all remote access; use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools; conduct regular phishing and security awareness training; and monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with active groups.